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ABSTRACT 
The thesis is based on the notion that a person's behaviour is largely 
a result of the interplay between his beliefs and values. A model is 
described which ccmbines Personal Construct Theo~J (as a means of 
describing beliefs) and Multi-Attributed Utility Theory (as a means 
of describing values) in order to predict purposive choice behaviour. 
The model is applied to choice of records, books, clothes and role 
behaviours and is found to predict choices with a high degree of 
accuracy. Prediction using personal constructs is shown to be superior 
to that using supplied dimensions. Furthermore, construct weights 
elicited by a lottery tech~que are shown generally to be purpose-
specific and to give better predictions of behaviour than UIUt weights. 
The model is then used to investigate the sentencing of offenders by 
magistrates and is again found to predict behaviour with a high degree 
of accuracy. The data also indicate the problems inherent in using 
verbal measures of construct similarity since the same words may be 
used differently and different words may be used similarly. 
Claims for the model's broad applicability are illustrated by using 
the model to reformulate the concepts of 'attention' and 'role' and 
a means of operationally defining role conflict is suggested. 
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"When a man starts to learn, he is never clear about his objectives. 
His purpose is faulty; his intent is vague. He hopes for rewards 
that will never materialize, for he knows nothing of the hardships 
of learning ••• ·Learning is never what one expects. Every step of 
learning is a new task." (Castaneda, 1970, p.84) 
For Denise, who helps me through the "hardships". 
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GENERAL OVERVIEW 
Chapter 1 is an introductory chapter in which Personal Construct 
Theory and Multi-Attributed Utility Theory are described. The 
advantages and disadvantages of each theory are outlined and a 
synthesis is proposed which also incorporates the notion of purpose. 
The chapter concludes with a summary and statement of aims. 
Chapter 2 contains a detailed description of the methodology used in 
the study, and includes various methodological considerations. The 
question of validation is raised and the chapter concludes with a 
summary of the method. 
Chapter J documents the use of the method with seven subjects. The 
areas of application include choices among records, books and clothes. 
The results are discussed in relation to their theoretical and 
methodological implications. Two variations on the model are also 
described. One involves the comparison of predictions using constructs 
and semantic differential scales; the other describes an attempt to 
indicate the model's applicability in recurrent situations. 
Chapter 4 is written in two parts. The first part discusses the 
problem of ranking and weighting dimensions. The question of unit 
weighting schemes is discussed and the data from Chapter J are 
analysed in relation to this question. In the second part, 
applications of the model to the field of personality are discussed 
and the chapter ends with a summary of the major points thus far. 
Chapter 5 documents the use of the method to study the sentencing 
behaviour of nine magistrates. The question of validation is again 
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discussed, with reference to the theory of generalizability. 
Chapter 6 contains the perceived implications of the results and 
some speculations concerning future use of the model. The studies ,~ 
described in Chapter 1 are reconsidered in terms of the model, and 
reformulations of the concepts of 'role' and 'attention' are offered. 
Chapter 7 contains a summary of the study and conclusions to be drawn 
from the results. The implications of the results for practical 
applications are presented, and the chapter concludes with some 
speculations concerning a theory of values. 
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INTRODUCTION 
-1-· 
In a recent book on the subject of beliefs and values, Scheibe 
began with the following supposition: 
"What a person does (his behaviour) depends upon what he 
wants (his values) and what he considers to be true or 
likely (his beliefs) about himself and the world (his 
psychological ecology)." (1970, p.l) 
Such a supposition could equally well have been written as an 
introduction to the present thesis since its main focus of concern 
is the prediction of behaviour on the basis of beliefs and values. 
More specifically, a model will be described which uses Kelly's 
(1955) Personal Construct Theory in conjunction with Raiffa's (1969) 
l~ilti-Attributed Utility Theory in order to predict purposive choice 
behaviour. While the former theory seems appropriate as a descriJ?t:;.on 
of beliefs,i t is difficult to use as a predictor of behc,jj.o1..l..:c~ 
Similarly, the latter theory seems appropriate as a descrip-c.:5.o" <.,. 
values but has not been very successful in predicting behavic",.T.', 
The testing of the model's ability td predict behaviour in a vari2t;y 
of choice situations will be described, and the implications for 
related areas of research will be discussed. However, we begin with. 
a brief description of the two areas to be conjoined and an 
evaluative survey of earlier work in the area. 
PERSONAL CONSTRUCT THEORY (PCT) 
The history of psychology is littered with analogies of the sort: 
man-the-telephone exchange, man-the-hydraulic system, man-the-
thermostat, and more recently man-the-computer. In formulating PCT, 
George Kelly contrived to add another analogy· to the list. However, 
the main difference between the analogies listed and the one chosen by 
~ 
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Kelly is that his is completely human. Kelly takes as lus paradigm 
the scientist. His central argument is that both experimenter and 
subject are engaged in a process of prediction and control -- that 
both are attempting to make sense of their environment in order to 
live in it. In Bartlett's (1932) terms, they are engaged in an 
"effort after meaning". 
Conceptually at least, Kelly's approac~ bears certain similarities 
to Brunswik's (1952, 1956), "probabilistic functionalism" in that 
both are essentially concerned with the adaptive inter-relationsrup 
bet\Jeen an organism and its environment. In a similar vein, Peterson 
and Beach (1967) chose to study "man as an intuitive statistic.iantt~ 
The point of vie\J underlying these authors' revie\J of researCH was 
that "man must come to terms with his uncertain environment'! (p.42). 
HO\Jever J their approach \Jas essentially normative since theJ 
c:ompared human inferences \Ji th the optimal inferences \Jhich '.;ould 
be made by \Jhat they call "statistical man". 
For Kelly, science is not an activity fully differentiated from 
normal understanding and practised by a t~ained elite. Rather, it. 
is a universally and uniquely human activity \Jhich "scientists" 
have formalised and made more rigorous in their attempts to achieve 
understanding of particular classes of phenomena. 
Central to Kelly's psychology is that a man may construe his 
environmont in an infinitude of different \Jays. In this vie\J man is 
in no sense stimulus-bound, though he may \Jell be bound by his 
construal of the \Jorld. Man is seen as representing or modelling his 
environment -- this is the only \Jay he can kno\J it -- and is more or ~) 
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less successful in doing so to the extent that he cap cope with it 
through the predictions his constructions permit. 
Kelly calls the means of representing the environment !!constructs". 
A personls constructs are the goggles through which he views the 
world. A construct is a bi-polar dimension, a way of categorising 
similarities and differences which we perceive in our environment. 
Since a man can only know I reality I through his system of constructs, 
then we need not include an experimenter's view of what Scheibe 
calls his !!psychological ecology!! since his behaviour will be based 
on his own view. In fact, if we are to predict a personls behav:icU1: 
:Ln any Situation, then we first need to know how he construes the 
particular situation. 
The Repertory Grid 
Kelly developed the Repertory Grid as a means of externciising part. 
, 
of a person I S construct system. Essentially, a grid is a t"JO-
dimensional array in which any particular cell Xij contains 
information about element j in relation to construct i. (An element 
is any 'object of construction' and may in some instances be a 
construct -- ie., one may construe constructs.) 
Kelly himself used a dichotomous system of information coding in 
the grid. For example, elements which are described by one pole of 
a construct may be designated 1./' and elements which are described 
by the other pole may be designated 'X'. In addition, the system 
can be made trichotomous by allowing a !!not applicable!! response 
I 
---.~----- - ------ ---------~- ---------- -- ------ -
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the element is described by neither pole of the construct. 
While this method was sufficient for Kelly's purposes, it does not 
allow any fine discriminations to be represented. However, two 
other forms of the grid have been popularised in recent years. These 
are the 'ranking' form and the 'rating' form (Bannister & Mair, 1900) ~ 
In the ranking form of the grid, the .elements are arranged in order 
of distance from the emergent pole of the construct. Hence, if there 
are six elements, then the element most like the emergent pole is 
ranked 1, and the element least like this pole is ranked 6. Thus, 
the implicit pole may not need to be mentioned, but may affect thE 
ranking. For example, suppose we have a case where two of the elSE, .lts 
to be ranked are 'wife' and 'mother-in-law' and the emergent pole of 
the construct is labelled 'cool'. It is quite likely that the rankLlg 
of the two elements would be different if the implicit pole was 
'uncool' than if it was 'warm'. (Humphreys, 1973) 
In the rating form of the grid, each construct is considered as ~ 
linear scale ranging from the emergent pole to the implicit pole. 
Hence, each element may be assigned a rating which reflects its 
position on the construct. The use of a rating scale obviates the 
difficulty described above in relation to ranking. Such a method 
also allows more discrimination to be made than the trichotomous 
method. 
The rating form of the grid is often compared with Osgood's 
semantic differential technique (Osgood, Suci & Tannenbaum, 1957). 
The main difference is that in a grid the dimensions are provided 
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by the subject -- hence the Ilpersonal ll in peT. More formally stated, 
Osgood was interested in what we might call 'public semantic space! 
whereas Kelly was interested in 'private semantic space'. 
Limitations of peT 
Earlier (p.l ) it was stated that peT is difficult to use as a 
predictor of behaviour. This conclusion is supported by the fact 
that very few attempts have been reported in the literature. 
Bannister and Mair (1968) include the following description: 
"In an experimental situation (Mair, 1966), the dimensions 
used to make sense of, and discriminate between different 
types of paintings were elicited from a group of people; and 
an attempt was made to explore the degree to which these 
subjects could take in limited information about each other's 
preferences, and use it to make accurate predictions abc,ut 
the kind of pictures the others would like best.1t 
Since this is the only description available of an otherwise 
unpublished study, evaluation is difficult. However, the fact that 
no results are reported suggests that difficulties were encountered. 
Furthermore, the grids were obviously not the only basis for 
prediction since subjects were provided with unspecified "information 
about each other's preferences ll • 
Reid and Holley (1972) used "repertory grid techniques ll to study 
choice of university. However, their work could hardly be considered 
as involving 'personal' constructs since they used 32 subjects to 
elicit 9 constructs which were then provided to the main 70 subjects. 
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The ratings on these constructs were then related to choice of 
university. The authors report that "relationships existed between 
the manner in which the respondents located the universities on the 
constructs and their decisions on whether or not to apply to them." 
(p.56). In an attempt to specify the relative importances of 
"perceptions of universities" and "environmental factors" (which 
were really biographical details), the data were subjected to factor 
analysis. Seven factors, accounting for only 48.7% of variance, were 
obtained. Since the last three factors were described as "not 
interpretable", this means that only 34%, of variance was accounted 
for, 12.5%:being accounted for by the first factor. Hence, although 
the study is interesting at a conceptual level (ie., relating a 
person's views to choice behaviour and posing questions about 
relative importances), the methodology leaves much to be desired and 
the results are consequently of little value. 
The only other major published work which relies on PCT to model 
behaviour is Duck's work on friendship formation (Duck, 1973a, 1973b, 
1975; Duck and Spencer, 1972). Using Kelly's sociality and 
commonality corollaries, Duck has suggested that friendships are 
formed initially on the basis of observable similarity, but that as 
the friendship develops, the focus of attention is psychological 
similarity. If this is tr~e, argues Duck, then different measures 
will be appropriate at different stages of friendship, a fact which 
may explain equivocal results in previous studies of the relationship 
between personality similarity and acquaintance. Hence, he finds that 
similarity as measured by the California Personality Inventory 
characterises early friendship but that longer-standing friendships 
are characterised by similarity in construing. 
1 
j 
I 
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Although Duck's results generally support his hypotheses, his work 
is not without certain difficulties. Two minor problems are that 
this formulation does not account for 'complementary' friendships 
in which each person is what the other is not, and that it precludes 
friendsr~ps in which the people are psychologically similar but 
'observably' different. More fundamentally, Duck's means of measuring 
similarity of construing leaves much to be desired since it is based 
on the verbal labels with which subjects describe their constructs. 
Evidence will be presented later (Chapter 5) which suggests that 
although people may employ the same words to describe constructs, 
the constructs are used very differently in the way they treat what 
are ostensibly the same elements. 
To summarise, peT has shown itself to be useful as a means of 
describing beliefs at a particular point in time, as evidenced by 
the vast number of clinical studies in which its use has been 
reported. However, it is difficult to extract behavioural pre::iieti::'llS 
from a repertory grid. 
MULTI-ATTRIBUTED UTILITY THEORY (MAUT) 
Utility theory is a part of measurement theory that deals with 
evaluating objects by numbers that are consistent with the decision 
makerls preferences, tastes and values. If the choice entities vary 
on more than one dimension of value, then they are classed as multi-
attributed. Hence, MAUT is concerned with assigning utilities to 
multi-attributed choice entities. 
The assumptions of utility models fall into three categories: 
a) Assumptions that the decision maker can exhibit preferences 
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and that he does so consistently as if he were maximising something. 
These assumptions are often summarised as the !tweak order" axiom. 
b) Independence assumptions that require preferences among 
choice entities to be independent of certain manipulations of these 
choice entities. These assumptions are called cancellation, 
monotonicity, preferential independence, utility independence and 
the like. 
c) "Technical" assumptions that prohibit abnormalities in 
preferences. One abnormality is that some choice entity is infinitely 
desirable (llheaven") or infinitely undesirable ("hell"). "Archimedian" 
axioms prohibit this from occurring. Another abnormality is that 
certain choice entities cannot be varied finely enough to produce 
indifferences with some other fixed choice entities. "Solvabilit,," 
axioms prohibit such gaps in the set of choice entities. 
(v.Winterfeldt, 1975). 
Although a variety of utility models exist, it is the additive models 
which have received most attention. These models have intuitive 
rational appeal and are robust against minor model violations. They 
can approximate other models rather well when utilities in single 
attributes are monotone functions of the attribute values 
(v.Winterfeldt and Fischer, 1973). Arguments for the robustness of 
such models can be found in Yntema and Torgerson (1961), Fischer 
(1972) and v.Winterfeldt and Edwards (1973). 
The present study will concern itself with the particular additive 
model proposed by Raiffa (1969). We may represent Raiffa's model 
thus: 
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The utility of outcome n, Un , is given by 
Un = >-1 X1n + ~2X2n + A3X3n +... + ArXrn 
where Xrn is the rating of outcome n on the rth attribute 
dimension, and Ar is the weight assigned to the rth 
dimension. 
It can be seen that this model is derived from the additive conjoint 
measurement model which may be represented thus: 
n 
F(Xj) = 2: fi(Xij) 
i=l 
. , 
(after v.Winterfeldt and Fischer (1973): Model 1.4) 
Here, fi(Xij) scales the part-worth of outcome Xj on dimension i. 
As Raiffa points out, for any Xij' Ui(Xij) is monotonically related 
to fi(Xij ). 
Given a scaling procedure which yields attribute values gi(Xij), 
monotonically related to fi(Xij ) and hence to Ui(Xij ), a basic 
reference lottery ticket (brlt) based procedure may be used to 
construct the Ui(Xij ) directly. The relation is of the form 
ui (Xij) = Ai [ gi (Xij )] where L Ai = 1 
The J\i assessed by brlt-based procedures are in fact products of 
[Value-wise importance Weigh~ x [relati ve scaling factor J 
wi qi 
Hence ~(Xij) = wiqihi [gi(Xij )] 
x [fi to ui correction] 
hi 
Under conditions of riskless choice we may assume that hi = 1 
(i = 1 to n), giving 
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From a conjoint measurement point of view, the separation of ~i 
into wiqihi and )(i into wiqi is both unnecessary and vacuous since 
Ui' qi and hi cannot be assessed separately from one another 
(Humphreys, 1975). 
All utility models are normative in the sense that they prescribe 
the optimal decision, ie., the 'perfect' decision maker should . , 
choose the object or outcome with the highest utility. However, it 
is also possible to use a model in a descriptive sense, ie., by 
observing the extent to which the model will predict choice berAviour. 
The normative/descriptive distinction is often blurred in any 
particular application. The distinction is perhaps best exemplified 
by the follOwing two statements: 
a) People tend to be 'conservative' information processors 
when compared wi th Bayes t theorem. (Norma ti ve) 
b) Bayes' theorem is an imperfect predictor of human 
information processing behaviour. (Descriptive) 
Hence, in the present study Raiffa' G model will be used in a 
descriptive sense in an attempt to predict choice behaviour. Although 
Raiffa's model was formulated to deal with risky decision situations, 
it will be applied to what are essentially riskless situations in 
the present study. However, an additive representation under risk 
implies an additive representation under certainty. 
Limitations of MAUT 
Despite the mathematical power and elegance of multi-attributed 
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utility models, their usefulness as either descriptive or normative 
models depends on the initial selection of attributes. As Raiffa 
:put it: 
"There is a real substantive question that I would like to 
duck even though it is of major importance; that is: Are these 
20 attributes a sufficiently rich and meaningful set of 
descriptors to capture the essence of the problem area?" 
(1969, p.22) 
Raiffa was not alone in his ducking of the question, for three years 
later Fischer wrote: 
" ••• it should be noted that this research completely ignored 
the problem of defining the list of value attributes relevant 
to a given decision. These were simply given to the subjects 
as part of their tasks ••• This criticism applies not only to 
the present research, but also to virtually all psychological 
studies of preferences for multi-attributed alternatives." 
(1972, p.84-5) 
Hence we have a situation where experimenters provide a set of 
attributes; yet we started with the supposition that a person's 
behaviour depends upon his own beliefs. 
A SYNTHESIS 
. , 
It would seem that each of the theories described provides an answer 
to the other's problems. peT offers a means of eliciting meaningful 
attribute dimensions and MAUT offers a means of predicting (or, 
indeed, prescribing) behaviour on the basis of these dimensions. 
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The first research on the combination was published by Humphreys 
and Humphreys (1975). This paper indicates which of the MAUT 
assumptions have a direct bearing on the situation when using a 
repertory grid. Briefly, these are a) monotonicity of attribute 
dimensions, and b) weak conditional utility independence. 
The Present Study .' 
The present study represents an attempt to develop and apply a model 
based on PCT and MAUT with the important add! tion of the notion of 
'purpose'. Consider first the following criticisms of Humphreys and 
Humphreys' work. 
The first, somewhat minor point relates to the number of dimensions 
elicited from each subject. Humphreys and Humphreys cite Kozielecki 
(1970) as presenting evidence that intuitive decision makers are 
able to make use of a maximum of about six dimensions of variability 
at any one time. They therefore elicited only six dimensions from 
each subject. In the present case, the dimensions will be used in 
several situations. Hence, although a person may only use six 
dimensions in any one situation, a 'pool' of dimensions is necessary 
in order to allow people maximum discrimination within any one 
situation~ That is, the dimensions selected from the pool for use 
may vary from situation to situation. Furthermore, Miller (1956) 
makes the point that if the dimensions can be superordinated then 
many more can be handled. The superordinate nature of constructs is 
fundamental to Kelly's theory (cf. his organization corollary). 
Hence, we need not limit the number of dimensions so severely. 
~ . 
. ............ __ ._-_ .. _------
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The second, major point relates to the nature of the Kelly/Raiffa 
model. As used by Humphreys and Humphreys, the model was essentially 
static and offered no possibility for change. That is, given the 
same elements from which to choose, the model would predict the same 
choice each time. This is patently not the case in the real world; we 
do not choose the same book each time we go to the book-case. Brief 
introspection suggests that what differs between visits to the book-
case is the purpose we have in choosing a book. That is, if we are 
to talk meaningfully about the utility of an object, we must do so 
in relation to the purpose or goal of the decision maker. 
To illustrate this with the Humphreys' example of films, consider 
the construct 'violent -- non-violent' • This construct may be VG:~"2 
important (heavily weighted) if one is choosing a film to ;;';126 wi ,.', 
a squeamish girl-friend. However, if one merely wants to ~lndn1.g8 .in 
some temporary 'escapism' such a construct may not contribute much 
to the choice of film -- although it is still a construct which 011e 
brings to ,bear on films. Hence, the utility of any particular film 
will depend in part on the purpose one has in choosing a film, and 
we might therefore expect the pattern of construct weightings to 
change as the decision situation changes. 
To a certain extent, Shepard (1964) anticipated this idea, saying: 
" ••• the relative weights to be assigned to the component 
attributes are not always determinate and may, in fact, depend 
on the adoption of one of several incompatible but equally 
tenable systems of subjective goals. 1I (p.257) 
However, whereas Shepard saw goals as a source of "nonoptimality" 
and therefore problematic, it is here contended that a consideration 
i---
1 
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of goals or purposes is fundamental to an understanding of decision 
making behaviour. Hence, the present approach will be to include 
the notion of purpose in the Kelly/Raiff'a model and thereby avoid 
a static state of affairs. 
To be fair to Humphreys and Humphreys, it is not only their research 
which was static since all applications of MAUT are similar. For 
example, v.Winterfeldt and Fischer (1973) mention time-variable 
choices but the models they suggest to deal with such choices employ 
various methods of time discounting. Similarly, Bauer and Wegener 
(1975) recognise the need for a model which would allow for IIdynamic 
development over time" (p.412) since their own use of MAUT procedures 
were merely iterative. Indeed, v.Winterfeldt (1975), in describing 
the content of his review paper said that " ••• dynamic decision 
situations, and group decision makers will be omitted, because 
appropriate utility models are missing for these cases." (p.12). 
To introduce the notion of purpose into a discussion is still seen 
by many psychologists as an unnecessary act. Indeed, it wa0 not 
until recently that the use of the word 'teleological' signified 
anything other than an appeal to god-given goals, and Pittendrigh 
(1958) coined the term 'teleonomic' in order to avoid such 
connotations (Lorenz, 1969). 
In the present context, the notion of purpose is taken to mean no 
more than that the person to whom purpose is attributed is behaVing 
in a goal-directed manner. Much behaviour is describable in such 
terms. Indeed, Sartre (1963) argues that all human actions are 
directed towards 'ends' and that comprehension of others is achieved 
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on~y through a realisation of their ends. 
Although neither Personal Construct theorists nor Utility theorists 
discuss purpose directly, such a notion is clearly compatible with 
PCT and MAUT since it implies that a person anticipates the outcome 
of his actions and values such outcomes. In the sense that purpose 
is a property of a system (cf. +aylor, 1964), it can thus be seen to 
be a property of a system of dynamic beliefs and values·. 
It should be noted that Scheibe's statement quoted earlier (p.l) 
does not presume a certain type of behaviour. That is, all behaviour 
is seen as being guided by the interplay of beliefs and ·values. 
Furthermore, this generality is not reduced by either of the theori'.;:3 
here conSidered; both PCT and MAUT are essentially contentless. 
Hence, the model may reasonably be expected to have a wide range of 
applicability in terms of conceptualising different behaviours. Also, 
to the extent that PCT is a theory of 'personality' (Kelly, 1963), 
the model may also have applicability in conceptualising different 
personalities. Both areas of applicability will be explored in later 
chapters. 
SUMMARY STATEMENT AND AIMS 
The repertory grid can be used to describe a person's beliefs about 
a particular set of choice objects. The matrix of ratings contained 
in the grid can be used as the basis of Raiffa's multi-attributed 
utility model to predict which of the objects will be chosen. We 
represent the model thus: 
The utility of alternative n, Un , is given by 
r--------- -----
] 
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In this case ~n represents the rating of element n on construct r. 
In any particular situation, the model predicts that the decision 
maker 'Will choose the al ternati ve "ltD. th the highest value of U. 
Furthermore, it is hypothesised that the A-weights 'Will change as 
a function of the decision situation or the decision maker1s purpose. 
In general terms, it is the aim of the present study (a) to test the 
model1s ability to predict choice behaviour and, if necessary, fLU'ther 
develop the model, (b) investigate the hypoth~sis that A-weights 
change as a function of the decision maker1s purpose, (c) given th8 
results of. (a) and (b), attempt to apply the model in a previously 
unexplored lreal life! area. More specific hypotheses \~ll be 
proposed and tested where appropriate in later chapters. 
. , 
CHAFTER 2 
METHODOLOGY 
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In order to describe clearly the use of the Raiffa method in 
conjunction with a repertory grid, it may be helpful to make repeated 
reference to an example. ~or this reason, consider the following: 
The subject is a 26-year-old male Clinical Psychologist and the 
area of decision making he has chosen to consider is related to 
L.P. records. 
He has listed nine different situations in which he chooses a 
record to play. Examples of these situations are when he wants 
'music to doze by', 'music as a background to study' and so 
forth. 
He has also listed ten L.P. records with which he is familiar 
and which form a cross-section of his musical interest. These 
ten records have been used as elements in a repertory grid in 
order to elicit seven constructs and each element has been 
rated on each construct. For each of his nine situations, the 
subject has specified the preferred pole of each constructo ThaT, 
is, he has specified on which pole of each construct his 'ide~1 
element for that situation would lie, and has repeated this 
procedure for each .si tuation. l 
In addition to the material already obtained, an intuitive preference 
ordering of the elements for each situation is required. In practice, 
each preference ordering is usually obtained immediately prior to the 
corresponding Raiffa elicitation procedure, since subjects then only 
need to 'think themselves into' each situation once. 
1. If the ideal point does not lie at the end of the dimension it is 
necessary to "fold" the dimension about the ideal point (Coombs y 
1964). Failure to do so would violate the monotonicity assumption. 
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Raiffa discusses several techniques for weighting attribute dimensiuns, 
the most promising of which is based on a series of lotteries. Assuming 
weak conditional utility independence (wcui) , a lottery technique may 
be used to establish relationships between paired sets of dimensions. 
A hierarchy may be used to decompose the total set of dimensions into 
subset8, provided there a~e only two branches at each node of the 
hierarchy. (Although Raiffa discusses the hierarchical structure of 
attributes, the use of a hierarchy in decomposition is attributable 
to Humphreys and Humphreys (1975).) 
Use of the lottery method is based mainly on its superiority to other 
methods in assessing importance weightings. Examples of applications 
using the method are: evaluation of hypothetical compact cars (Fiscner, 
1972), evaluation of apartments by students (v.Winterfeldt and Edwards, 
1973), and evaluation of 6inema films (Humphreys and Humphreys, 1975). 
In each of these applications, lottery techniques were found to be at 
least as good or better than alternative methods in predicting 
wholistic evaluation of outcomes. 
I 
Within the additive framework, the two major alternatives to the 
lottery method are the compensation method and the direct r~ting 
method. The former has been used by v.Winterfeldt and Edwards (1973) 
in the evaluation of apartments by students under riskless choice. 
They found this method to be inferior to a lottery method but superior 
to a direct rating method. As might be expected from notions of 
transitivity, direct rating method has also proved inferior to the 
lottery method in predicting wholistic evaluation (Fischer, 1972; 
v.Winterfeldt and Edwards, 1973; Chapman, 1974). 
I 
r-
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In theory, any hierarchical representation which meets the 'two 
branches per node' requirement can be used as the basis for the 
series of lotteries. However, the present author follows Humphreys 
and Humphreys (op. cit.) in using hic:rarchical cluster analysis 
since, as they argue, such a method optimises the chance of 
~;atisfying the wcui assumption. The argument is based on the fact 
that degree of association between constructs de9reases as one 
" 
progresses up the hierarchy. Hence, estimates of A involving large 
numbers of constructs have the best chance of meeting the wcui 
assumption since, if dimensions are value-wise non-independent they 
will be correlated. That is, J\ estimates with a large number of 
implications have the best chance of displaying value-wise 
independence. (A more extensive discussion of hierarchical 
decomposition is contained in Chapter 4). 
Consider the following hierarchy of constructs: 
.\ 
-
. 1\ 
/)\ /\ 1\ 
ABC D E F G 
C) 
The first stage in the procedure is to consider the pair of constructs 
which are most highly related -- in this case Band C. For the 
particular situation under consideration, the subject will have 
designated one pole of each construct as preferred. 
. . 
j 
~ 
1 
J 
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Following Raiffa's notation, let B* and O· represent the preferred 
poles of these constructs, and let B* and O. represent the non-
preferred poles. The subject is then asked to choose between a gamble 
and a 'sure thing'. If he chooses the gamble, he might get a 
stereotype element with the properties [B* and 0*] with probability P, 
or he might get a stereotype element with the properties [B* and 0.] 
with probability l-P. If he chooses the sure thing, he gets a 
,-
stereotype element with the properties [B~ and c.] . 
The value of P is then varied until the subject is indifferent between 
the gamble and the sure thing. It can be shown that, for this value 
of P, the ratio between P and l-P is the same as the ratio between 
the relative weightings of thectwo constructs. These values may be 
entered onto the hierarchy as follows: 
• \ 
• \ .1\, !7fV /\ /\ 
ABO D E F G 
In this case, when P = 0.7 the subject is indifferent between the 
gamble and the sure thing. 
This procedure is carried out for each node in the hierarchy until 
the 'top' is reached, at which point each section of the hierarchy 
will have a number between 0.0 and 1.0 associated with it. Thus, in 
the present example, the subject would next be offered a gamble 
1 
I 
! 
I 
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between elements with the properties [(B* + C*) + A*-] or 
[(B;jf + C,,) + 4] or a sure thing with the properties [(B* + C*) + 4J. 
At each node, constructs forming subordinate nodes are considered as 
inseparable units. 
Having dealt with construct A, the next comparison to be made would 
be D - E, followed by F - G. The subject would t~en be offered the 
following choice: 
A gamble between elements 
with the properties: 
cD*' + E*) 
with 
and probability 
(F* +. G*) P 
OR 
(D. + E.) with 
and probability 
(F.;. + G*) I-P 
.-
OR 
A sure thing w?: th 
the properties: 
,(D* + E*) 
and 
For the present example, the final choice representing the uppermost 
node of the hierarchy would be as follows: 
A gamble between elements 
with the properties: 
(D* + E* + F* + G*) 
and P 
(A* + B.r; + C*) 
OR 
!(D* + E., + F* + G*) 
and I-P 
(~ + B* + C,,) 
OR 
. . 
A sure thing wi th 
the properties: 
(D* + E* + F* + G*) 
and 
(4 + B* :- C*) 
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This final choice having been made, each section of the hierarchy 
should now have a relative weighting associated with it, as follows: 
'\ 
. 
. 1\4 
A/\~ . \ 
/ .7j'\~ t\'-rV 
ABC D E F G 
Trus hierarchy is now analogous to a decision tree, and the 'conditional 
probability' of each construct can be calculated by multiplying along 
the arms, ego 
Conditional probability of B = 0.7 x 0.6 x 0.9 = 0.378 
It is this conditional probability which Raiffa terms the value-wise 
importance, A, of each construct. 
When a repertory grid is elicited, it is often the case that the 
emergent pole of each construct is assigned to the '1' end of, say, a 
1 - 5 scale, and the implicit pole is assigned to the '5' end. However, 
if the grid is to be used to derive a preference ordering, then each 
construct should be so arranged that the preferred pole is assigned to 
the '5' end of the scale. A grid which has been so arranged is called a 
'preferred pole' grid. Since the preferred pole of a construct may be 
different for different situations, the preferred pole grid may 
therefore differ between situations. 
].; 
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Consider the following preferred pole grid for the seven constructs 
in the example: 
ELEMENTS (L.P's) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
A 1 4 2 3 5 3 3 
B 2 1 5 3 4 2 4 
c 4 2 4 1 5 3 1 
D 1 2 4 5 3 2 3 
E 5 3 3 2 4 1 5 
F 3 2 3 1 5 4 4 
G 4 1 3 2 3 3 5 
The next stage in the technique is to multiply the A-weighting for 
each construct by the ratings on that construct. Hence, since ~ = 0.36 
the ratin.gs on construct A would now look as follows: 
IA 10.36 1.44 0.72 1.08 1.80 1.08 1.08 1 
When each construct has been weighted, weighted ratings may now be 
summed for each element. Since it can be shown that the array of sums 
is a monotonic transformation of an array of expected utilities, then 
a preference order may now be derived by ranking elements in terms of 
these sums. That is, the element with the largest sum is taken to be 
the most preferred element, and so forth. This preference order may 
then be correlated with the subject's actual preference order for this 
8i tua tion. 
This, then, is the basic method of weighting a set of constructs. 
However, since the pattern of preferred poles may change in relation 
to different situations -- and even if they stay the same, the relative 
weightings may change -- the whole procedure must be repeated for each 
si tuation. 
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The correlation between actual and predicted preference order is the 
main basis for evaluating the descriptive power of the model. As' 
Phillips (1973) has pointed out, there are several reasons why it is 
not appropriate to apply a traditional test of significance to such a 
correlation. Indeed, previous research already suggests that the 
correlation will be non~zero, so to test the result against a null 
hypothesis would be hypocritical. 
,-
Edwards, Phillips, Hays and Goodman (1968) suggest that such a model 
may be further evaluated by comparing its performance with alternative 
models. Humphreys and Humphreys (op. cit.) have already favourably 
compared the Raiffa solution to various other solutions (eg. factor 
analytic, multi-dimensional scaling, etc.). Hence the present study 
I 
will concentrate mainly on the correlations, although the results of 
alternative weighting schemes will be discussed in Chapter 4. In 
addi tion, since X-weights will be obtained for several situations, 
the hypothesis that any one set of A-weights may predict choice in 
other situations will be tested. The question of validation will be 
returned to in Chapter 5. 
SUMMARY OF METHOD 
1) Ascertain area of decision making to be considered. 
2) Elicit purposes for decision making or situation~ in which decisions 
are made. 
3) Elicit set of choice objects. Use these as elements in order to 
elicit constructs. Rate elements on constructs. 
4) For each purpose/situation, rank order elements in terms of 
preference. Elicit weightings on constructs. 
5) Combine weightings and ratings to produce prediction of rank 
i 
~'~:';'.~:~,.:' -r • ~.,:. 
! L __ 
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ordering. 
6) Compare (correlate) predicted and act~ rank ordering. 
It can be seen that steps 4 - 6 form an iterative loop which is 
traversed until no more purposes remain. 
In practice, the grid resul tlng from step 3 is cluster analysed in 
order to yield the hierarchy of constrUcts before step 4 is undertaken. 
, . 
" 
, ...~-... -~.--------, .. -.~ . . ,-----------_. ._-_. --..... 
CHAPTER 3 
SOME STUDIES USING THE METHOD 
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In this chapter results obtained using the model in a variety of 
choice situations are presented. It should be noted that the time 
commitment per subject is quite high (somewhere in the region of 
10 hours ± 4 hours) and in cases where the 'experiment' has been 
extended, the time commitment is proportionally greater. Although 
this amount of time was spread over several weeks by dividing it into 
discrete sessions, subjects were informed of the ,total commitment 
.-
during recruitment. 
In view of this time commitment and in view of the fact that 
(initially, at least) payment of subjects was not feasible, it was 
felt that recruitment would be most successful if it used personal 
acquaintance as an introduction. Hence, all subjects described in the 
present chapter were personal acquaintances of either the author or 
his wifeo 
In point of fact, Subject 6 was paid for his co-operation although at 
no time during the experiment did he know he would be paid. He was 
paid because a) by this time a limited amount of money had become 
available, and b) he. needed the money. Two days after the conclusion 
of the experiment he was paid £5 which was calculated on the basis of 
an estimated 10 hours at the standard rate of 50p per hour. Subject 7 
declined to accept a similar offer made after he h~d completed the 
experiment. 
The sessions used with subjects were organised as follows: 
1) An initial session in which the subject delimited the area 
to be considered and listed the purposes which they brought to the 
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area. This list was then put aside and elements were elicited by 
asking the subject to list about 10 objects which they felt 
represented a good cross-section of the range of objects from which 
they were used to choosing. In eliciting elements it is important to 
obtain a representative cross-section since they will then be used to 
elicit constructs. A 'bias' in element elicitation will increase the 
probability of a bias in construct el~citation wnich in turn will 
limit the situations to which the constrUcts have applicability_ 
When subjects were satisfied that they had adequately represented the 
range, the names of the objects were written on plain, white 
128mm x 76mm cards. These cards were then presented to the subject as 
triads and the subject was asked to consider some'way in which any 
two of the objects seemed similar. to each other and thereby different 
from the third. When the subject had described a construct in this 
manner, the pole descriptions were written on separate cards which 
were placed at opposite ends of a 5-point scale represented by five 
cards bearing the numbers 1 to 5 in order. Subjects were then 
presented with the complete set of element cards and asked to rate 
them on the construct by placing them under the appropriate number. 
In this way, constructs were elicited using the elements and a rating 
form repertory grid was generated. In principle, element triads can 
be chosen randomly. However, in the author's experience, random 
selection usually results in pairs of elements occurring more than 
once. In such cases, the 'easy solution' for the subject is to 
reiterate a construct already elicited on the basis of the recurring 
pair. For this reason, once the number of elements was known, a list 
. . 
j 
J 
1 
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of ten triads was drawn up in which no pair of elements occurred mor~) 
than once. That is, if the first triad contained elements 1, 2 and 3, 
no other triad would contain 1 and 3, or 2 and 3, or 1 and 2. With 
nine or ten elements this is very easy to arrange but obviously gets 
more difficult as the number of elements decreases • 
. 
By arranging the triads in this manner, the opportunity for a broad 
.-
spectrum of constructs to emerge is maximised without overtly 
influencing the subject. 
As the final exercise in the initial session, subjects were required 
to state their ideal point on each construct for each purpose. This 
was done by giving subjects a list of their constructs and asking 
them to think about their first purpose. With this purpose in mind, 
they were asked to state at which pole their ideal element would lie 
for each construct, or whether it would lie somewhere in between. In 
a.ll caoes, subjects stated a pole, thereby obviating the need to fold 
dimensions about the ideal point. 
2) Subsequent sessions in which A-weights were elicited. Only 
one set of weights was elicited in any session since this usually 
took one hour and often longer. As was stated earlier (po25 ), in the 
period between the grid-elicitation and the first weight-elicitation 
the grid was subjected to hierarchical cluster analysis in order to 
produce a hierarchy of constructs. Although the hierarchies were 
checked for excessively high matches, it did not prove necessary to 
ask any subject to modify his constructs. This was presumably because 
the triads of elements had been presented in such a way as to 
. . 
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minimise the possibility of very high matches occurring. 
Before each weighting session, the gambles indicated by the hierarchy 
and list of preferred poles were written. out on white cards such that 
the two options of the gamble were on separate cards and the sure 
thing was written on a third. Hence, each gamble was presented to the 
t 
subj ect in the form shown earlier (p.~l ) with the values of P and :) 
I-P written on smaller pieces of paper placed alongside the 
corresponding card. 
In considering each gamble, the problem is to find a value of P for 
which the subject is indifferent between the gamble and the sure 
thing. This problem is equivalent to the problem of threshold 
determination in psychophysics. In discussing the determination of 
thresholds, Woodworth and Schlosberg (1954) say: 
"From what has been said the Method of Limits is obviously a 
very flexible one. It can be used with a wide variety of 
stimuli and for a wide variety of purposes. It has one final 
merit: it is the one method that shows clearly the operations 
which define the concept of 'threshold'. That is, it shows 
directly where the stimulus passes the boundary separating one 
response category from another. It is thus the reference 
experiment for the concept." (p. 199) 
In the present case, what is being sought is the value of P where the 
response changes from 'gamble preferred' to 'sure thing preferred' or 
vice versa. Hence, a modified form of the method of limits was used 
in determining the indifference points. 
r 
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This was done by starting with a high value of P i.~., 0.9. If the 
subject preferred the sure thing, then P must be too low, and if the 
&ubject preferred the gamble then P must be too high. In most cases, 
this value of P proved too high, but in a few cases the value was 
increased to 0.95 or 0.99 before the subject became indifferent. If P 
was too high, a value of 0.5 was substituted and for most cases this 
proved too low. In the few cases wher~ this value of P was not low 
enough, a value of 0.1 was substituted and this was found to be below 
the indifference point in all cases. 
Hence, an upper and lower limit was established and the value of P 
was then adjusted alternately from the upper limit downwards and from 
the lower limit upwards until an indifference point was found. 
Occasionally an indifference range was found. In these cases the mean 
value was presented and subjects still professed indifference. Since 
no range was ever greater than 0.1 it was felt that use of the mean 
should not seriously distort the results. 
When subjects claimed indifference, this was checked by suggesting 
that if they were indifferent between the gamble and the sure thing 
they shouldn't mind a fair coin being tossed to determine which they 
received. In all cases this was accepted, although one subject found 
it somewhat strange that he had to make so many decisions in order to 
get to a position where he could toss a coin to decide for himl 
In presenting subjects with a sure thing [A* + B*] it is assumed 
that equivalent indifference points would be obtained using 
[4 + B*J , i.e., the scale between [A* + B*J and [~+ B*] is an 
'.':"''':,.--('. 
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interval scale isomorphic with the probability scale. From a purely 
rrocedural point of view, it would be possible to test this 
assumption by presenting each gamble twice -- once with each sure 
thing combination. 
However, from a methodological point of view, it was felt that such 
.".. 
blatent consistency checks would make.subjects defensive. That is, a 
large part of their attention would be directed towards remembering 
what they had said and being consistent rather than acting naturally. 
For this reason, it was decided not to carry out such checks. 
This having been said, it should be noted that gambles were 
occasionally presented twice, once with each sure'thing combination. 
However, this was not done in any. systematic fashion except that it 
was never done more than once with.any one subject. In such cases, 
the alternative gamble was presented seemingly spontaneously and 
explained as the experimenter wishing to try an idea which had just 
occurred to him. In all cases, equivalent indifference points were 
obtained. While this tends to support the assumption described above, 
it is still possible that subjects remembered their earlier 
judgements and responded accordingly. 
As was stated above, the elements of the repertory'grid were elicited 
from the subj ect. As far as the present author can aElcertuin, this is 
in contrast to all other reported applications of MAUT with the 
possible exception of Humphreys and Humphreys (1975) who allowed 
subjects to choose a sample of six elements from a set of 14 provided. 
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Subject 1 
Subject 1 was a 26-year-old male psychology postgraduate student. The 
area of decision making he chose to consider related to the playing of 
L.P. records. Ten records were elicited as elements and these were in 
turn used to elicit ten constructs. All elements were rated on all 
constructs, yielding the following repertory grid: 
I Zappa. "Hot Rats" --11~-; 2 2 3 3 2 4 1 3 3\ 
Whi tren. "Raw But Tender" 2 5 1 2 1 1 3 3 4 2 4 
. 
Stones. 
" 
••• Ya-Ya IS Outl1 ' 3 5 2 2 1 Q 2 5 2 ~ 3 
I Vivaldi. "Echo Concerto" 4 1 1 5 5 4 5 1 1 3 2 I Bach. tI) "Italian Concerto" ~ 5 1 1 5 4 5 4 2 1 3 2 
I Scarlatti. "Sonata in D" 9 6 3 1 5 2 5 4 3 1 4 5 
Paxton. l1Ain't That News" f;I:l 7 5 1 4 1 2 4 3 4 3 2 
Parker. "Bird Symbols" 8 3 3 1 3 1 2 3 1 1 2 
Rollins. "East Broadway •• " 9 4 5 1 3 1 1 4 1 5 3 
Blake. "Blues in Chicago" 10 5 1 2 2 2 3 4 5 1 2 
r-l C\l. C"'\ ....;t 0\ '-.0 r:-- to 0' 0 
rl 
CONSTRUCTS 
'D 
(1) 
~ 
~ ~ ~ ~ 0 (1) 
0 0 
I bD ~ 
Cr-l ~ 'D (1) 
rl -~ ;:j -..-I (1) H (1) 'D (Jl (1) 0 0) 'D 0 
:> (Jl ~ ~ 0 " H 'D -..-I IS ~ 0) bD ..p " bD 
" 
.r:: ~ ctl (1) E .J, (1) ~ 0) 0 -..-I H +3 .;.:> ~ (Jl ttl ;3 0 .;.:> :::1 ~ 0 .;.:> 0 0 s::: ~ .8 ~ ~ .s. 0) ~. (1) 0) .;.:> A ~: d. f;I:l:C::t1 <Xl CI) 
(1) 
H (1) 
'§ 
(1) 
IS 
0 
(Jl 
.;.:> 
bD .r:: 'D 
s::: bD 0 
:a -..-I ~ 0 .;.:> IS ttl 
0) ~ H bD 
. rl 'D (1) b.O (1) s::: 
0) :> s::: (1) 
-..-I 
" 
r-l .r:: -..-I -..-I .r:: .;.:> .;.:> 
'D rl 0 (Jl .;.:> 0 0 
-
ttl 
. (1) 0 :::1 (Jl g ttl (Jl E § H 0 1- (1) ~ H (1) .;.:> .;.:> H :>:, .;.:> :::1 0 
ttl ~ H Z: (Jl H (Jl rl :::1 rl 0 ~ 0) (Jl ~ ..a P=l ~ p... o· H· ~ <Xl: . <Xl 
-
FIGURE 1 : Elicited repertory grid for Subject 1. 
. ' 
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The subject listed eight purposes which he brought to the area, as 
follows: 
1) To cheer me up. 
2) To calm me down. 
-----
3) To drive by. 
4) To provide background whilst working. 
5) To send me to sleep. 
6) To dance to. 
7) To provide background over dinner. 
8) To be stranded on a desert island with. 
These are the purposes which he may have in choosing a record from ills 
collection. The final purpose was contributed in a spirit of fun by 
the subject since he saw the exercise as similar to that carried out 
on a well-known B.B.C. radio programme. 
For each purpose in turn, the subject was asked to rank order the 
elements in terms of preference, yielding the following matrix: 
(1 = most preferred, 10 = least preferred) 
ELEMENTS 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1 5 2 1 10 6 7 8 3 9 4 
2 9 7 8 1 2 4 3 6 10 5 
3 5 2 1 10 9 8 6 3 7 4 
4 5 9 10 1 2 4 6 7 3 8 
5 8 4 10 1 2 3 5 7 9 6 
6 1 5 3 10 9 8 6 2 4 7 
7 3 7 8 1 2 4 9 6 10 5 
8 5 3 4 10 9 8 7 1 6 2 
FIGURE 2 Intuitive preference orders for Subject 1. . , 
I 
L __ 
I 
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He was then asked to state at which pole of each construct his ideal 
element would lie, yielding the following matrix: 
CONSTRUCTS 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
~ r--
1 R L L L L L L R L R 
2 L R R R R R L L R L 
3 R L L L L L R R L L 
4 R R R R R R L L R R 
5 L R R R R R L. L R R 
6 R L L R L L R R L R 
7 L L L R R R L L L R 
8 L L L L L L R R L L 
FIGURE 3 : Construct preferred poles for Subject 1. 
Hence, if the left-hand (L) pole of a construct is preferred for a 
particular situation, the ratings on that construct must be reversed 
so that they reflect preference. This operation yields the preferred 
pole grid, as previously mentioned (p. 22). 
Then, for each situation in turn, a set of A-weights was elicited 
by the method described in Chapter 2, yielding the following matrix: 
CONSTRUCTS 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 I 
1 .05 .11 .15 .14 .095 .28 .03 .01 .085 .05 
2 .004 .2 .03 .08 .04 .57 .05 .014 .002 .01 
3 .015 .146 .136 .286 .054 .205 .029 .003 .076 .05 
4 .01 .07 .042 .21 .03 .374 .13 .074 .05 .01 
5 .008 .064 .029 .161 .034 .546 .119 .019 .01 .01 
6 .027 .075 .064 .238 .027 .363 .059 .029 .098 .02 
7 • 013 .092 .074 .241 .197 . .295 .035 .028 .015 .01 
8 .008 .126 .236 .068 .227 .059 .072 .05 .054 .1 
FIGURE 4-: Construct weightings for Subject 1. 
j 
-1 
-~ 
~ 
I 
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For each situation, the weightings and ratings were combined to yield 
a predicted rank ordering which was then correlated with the actual 
rank ordering for that situation. Figure 5 shows the correlations 
between actual and predicted rank orders. 
PURPOSE CORRELATION (Rs) 
1 To cheer me up. 0.820 
2 To calm me down. 0.951 
. 
, 
3 To drive by. 0.976 
4 To provide background whilst 'Working •. I 0.855 
5 To send me to sleep. 0.964 
6 To dance to. 0.733 
7 To provide background over dinner. 0.915 
8 To be stranded on a desert island with. 0.903 
FIGURE 5 Correlations between actual and predicted rank orders 
for ' Subject 1. 
Subject 2 
Subject 2 was a 23-year-old female Trainee Social Worker who wished to 
consider her'decision making in relation to 'the choice of reading 
material. 
Ten purposes in relation to this area were elicited, and the method 
as described was carried out using an elicited sample of ten books as 
elements, ten constructs being elicited. However, only one set of 
~ -weights was elicited -- those in relation to the first purpose 
after which the experiment was terminated by mutual consent since the 
subject felt that a recent increase in pressure of work would no 
longer al+ow her to give the time required. When the subject's actual 
choice 'Was correlated with predicted choice for the first situation, 
the result was Rs = -0.224. 
-3'-
Subject 3 
Subject 3 was a 26-year-old male Probationer Clinical Psychologist who 
wished to consider his decision making in relation to the playing of 
LeP. records. Ten records were elicited as elements and these were 
used to elicit ten constructs. 
Although Subject 3 originally listed nine purposes which he brought to 
this area, orily three purposes were investigated. After this time, the 
subject moved out of the geographical area as a result of a change in 
job and hence became unavailable for further investigation. 
The purposes considered were as follows: 
1) As general background. 
2) As a background to study. 
3) To 'doze' by. 
Figure 6 shows the correlations between predicted and actual rank 
orders. 
1 As 
2 As 
3 To 
FIGURE 6 
PURPOSE CORRELATION (Rs) 
general background. 0.564 
a background to study. 0.636 
'doze' by. 0.701 
Correlations between predicted and actual rank orders 
for Subject 3. 
Subject 4 
Subject 4 was a 25-year-old female Social Worker who wished to consider 
her decision making in relation to choice of clothes. Ten items of 
clothing were elicited and used as elements to elicit ten constructs. 
i 
i 
I 
t -37-
Although Subject 4 originally listed eight purposes which she brought 
to this area, only four were investigated. After this time the subjec+-: 
like Subject 3, changed job, moved out of the area and hence became 
unavailable. 
Figure 7 shows the correlations between predicted and actual rank 
orders for the purposes considered. 
PURPOSE CORRELATION (Rs) 
1 To relax in at home. 0.830 
2 To go to work in. 0.576 
3 To go to a party. 0.600 
4 To go on a picnic. 0.540 
FIGURE 7 Correlations between predicted and actual rank orders 
for Subject 4 .. 
Subject 5 
The investigation carried out in collaboration with Subject 5 represents 
a different use of the model. For this reason, a brief introduction to 
the use seems appropriate. 
Kelly's (1955) original use of the repertory grid was in a therapeutic 
setting as a means of exploring clients' perceptions of significant 
other people. This is reflected in his calling the grid the "Role 
Construct Repertory Grid". 
On the basis of Personal Construct Theory it seems reasonable to suggest 
that people use a particular set of constructs in viewing other people. 
Furthermore, since they are themselves a member of the class of objects 
to be construed, it follows that they can use these constructs in 
,--
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relation to themselves. Following this, the present author would argue 
that the roles which a person adopts can be defined in terms of 
different weighting sets on the relevant constructs. It is this 
reasoning which was tested with Subject 5. 
Subject 5 \Jas a 24-year-old female Trainee Social Worker who at the 
time was attending a full-time course leading to the Certificate of 
Qualification in Social Work. 
The rune elicited elements used in the grid were roles with which she 
had some interaction, and ten constructs were elicited, yielding the 
grid presented overleaf as Figure 8. 
Instead of purposes, a further seven roles were elicited, these being 
roles 1rJhich the subj ect actually occupies at various times, as follmJs: 
1) Wife. 
2) Daughter. 
3) Student. 
4) Neighbour. 
5) Consumer. 
6) Social idorker. 
7) Close friend, same sex. 
Hence, the elements iJere roles iJhich other people occupied and the 
'purposes' were roles which the subject occupied. If the above 
reasoning is correct, the subject sho~ld be able to construe herself 
in the same terms in which she construes others. 
Two other slight modifications to the method were used in order to 
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simplify the task for this subject. In considering the gambles, it 
was suggested that some omnipotent deity could provide her with a 
set of construct poles which she had to adopt; however, this deity 
was perverse enough to offer her a gamble or a sure thing. In this 
way the construct weightings were derived. Also, in ranking the 
elements in relation to each role, the subject was asked to choose the 
element she would most like to be if she could not adopt the reference 
role. That is, if she was in a situatiQn where she would normally adopt 
the role of 'wife' but was prevented from doing so by the omnipotent 
deity, would she rather play the role of bus conductor, doctor or 
secretary? In this way, a rank ordering of the elements was. obtained 
in relation to each of the seven reference roles. 
Figure 9 shows the correlations obtained between predicted and actual 
rank orders. 
ROLE CORRELATION (Rs) 
1 Wife. 0.900 
2. Daughter. 0.917 
3 Student. 0.900 
4 Neighbour. 0.867 
5 Consumer. 0.967 
6 Social Worker. 0.917 
7 Close friend, same sex. 0.967 
, 
Correlations between predicted and actual rank orders 
for Subject 5. 
Subject 6 
Subject 6 was a 26-year-old final year Psychology Honours student who 
wished to consider his decision making in relation to choice of reading 
j 
1 __ -
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material. 
. , 
He listed five purposes which he brought to this area, as follows: 
1) To keep up to date. 
2) To read on the Tube. 
3) To read on a plane. 
4) To while away time at home. 
5) To obtain specific information. 
The method used with Subject 6 was slightly different in that 20 
elements were elicited. These were then divided into two equal-sized 
groups which will be referred 'to as element sets 1 and 2. Element set 1 
was then used to elicit nine constructs, and all elements were then 
rated on these constructs. When ranking elements in relation to each 
purpose, each element set was ranked separately. The reasons behind this 
modification will be discussed later (p.57 ). 
The correlations obtained between predicted and actual rank orders are 
shown in Figure 10, as follows: 
CORRELATION (Rs) 
SET 1 SET 2 
PURPOSE ELEMENTS ELEMENTS 
1 To keep up to date o 0.903 00830 
2 To read on the Tube. 0.758 0.952 
i 
3 To read on a plane. 0.855 0.782 
4 To while away time at home. 00818 0.842 
5 To obtain specific information . 0.903 0.830 
FIGURE 10 Correlations between p~edicted and actual rank orders 
for Subject 6. 
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Subject 7 
Subject 7 was a 28-year-old Social Scientist who worked in a research 
institute. He chose to consider his decision making in relation to 
the choice of reading material. Nine elements were elicited and used 
to elicit eight constructs. 
The correlations between predicted and actual rank orders are shown 
in Figure 11, as follows: 
PURPOSE CORRELATION (Rs) 
1 I To read on the Tube. 0.917 I 
2 To read for escape. 0.883 
3 To cheer me up. 0.917 
14 To give as a present., 0.962 
I 5 To keep up to date. 0.917 
FIGURE 11 Correlations between predicted and actual rank orders 
for Subject 7. 
Discussion 
In view of the reasonably high nature of most of the correlations, it 
may be concluded that the model is a good predictor of choice behaviour 
(as expressed by wholistic ranking) in the situations studied. 
Therefore, attention will now be turned to those cases where the model 
seems to have been less than adequate. The most obvious of these cases 
is that of Subject 2 (Rs = -0.224). 
In view of the results obtained with Subject 1, this result was 
surprising. However, a brief interview with Subject 2 was sufficient 
to reveal the reason. Following the repertory grid elicitation which 
i 
involved the subject thinking in detail about the books used as 
elements, she had browsed through several of them and had completely 
re-read three of them. This activity took place in the week which 
elapsed between eliciting the grid and eliciting the )\-weights, and 
caused the subject to Ire-construe' the books. Hence, the elicited grid 
no longer represented the subject's view of the books, and as such 
could not be expected to provide a basis for prediction of choice 
behaviour. 
Unfortunately, circumstances were such that the subject did not have 
time to start the procedure again and hence the experiment was 
terminated. However, the single result obtained illustrates the point 
that an elicited repertory grid may not be stable over time, and indeed 
in many cases one would expect movement. Future studies could attempt 
to deal with this point in two ways: a) by having the subject re-rate 
the elements prior to each A-elicitation session, or b) by showing 
the subject his ratings and asking him to adopt the same construing 
position prior to each )\-elicitation session. Of the two methods, the 
former is probably preferable since it does not involve the subject 
adopting a 'false' position. 
Obviously, such lengths need only be gone to if there is reasonable 
reason to believe that the grid may not be stable. Chapman (1974) 
studied peoples' perceptions of mathematical commands (e.g., 'solve', 
'prove', etc.) and although he elicited A-weights up to eight weeks 
after eliciting the grid, he still obtained a high level of prediction. 
It seems intuitively reasonable that peoples' attitudes towards 
mathematics are more stable than their attitudes towards, say, clothes 
where one is constantly presented with new 'evidence' as fashion changes. 
· , 
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Although the results for Subject 3 are better than for Subject 2, the 
correlations obtained are relatively low. It seems likely that this 
was a result of Subject 3's reaction to the choice between a gamble 
and a sure thing. The problem manifested itself during the first 
A-elicitation session when Subject 3 repeatedly chose the gamble 
whether the ratio of P : I-P was 0.9 0.1 or 0.1 : 0.9 When 
questioned about this behaviour, he said he would always choose the 
gamble, no matter what the odds were, because he preferred a situation 
with an uncertain outcome- rather than a sure thing. 
What might be inferred from this behaviour is that, in terms of a 
hierarchy of purposes, gambling is a superordinate purpose to record-
listening for this subject. In Tversky's (1967) terms, the subject io 
exhibiting a positive utility for gambling. As Tversky points out, 
this is not compatible with classical utility theory. In 'normal' 
situations, the two purposes do not come into contact; the subject's 
choice of records is usually carried out under conditions of certainty. 
Hence, the subject's behaviour in the experimental situation highlights 
two potential problem areas: a) a possible response bias in relation 
to gamble Situations, and b) a possible inability of subjects to 'think 
themselves into' the situation sufficiently. This latter is a 
perennial problem in the decision theory field since many experiments 
require subjects to imagine that they are in a particular situation --
frequently a future situation. 
In this particular case, two methods were used to cope with the 
situation. The first was aimed at decreasing the attractiveness of 
the gamble by getting the subject to name the worst element he could 
I--
I 
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think of with the non-preferred combination of properties. When he 
had named such an L.P., the terms of the gamble were phrased such that 
if the non-preferred combination was the outcome, then he would have 
to listen to the detested L.P. for at least half an hour. This achieved 
the desired result to the extent that he then felt there were conditions 
under which he would choose the sure thing. 
The :3econd method simply involved asking the subject to try to overcome 
his tendency to choose the gamble. It was suggested that he do this by 
attempting to role-play someone with the same preferences for L.P.s 
but who was not particularly attracted to gambles. In a sense, this 
was conceptually the least satisfactory method since it asked the 
subject to behave 'unnaturally', i.e., not as he would normally behave. 
However, the combination of methods did seem to steer the results in 
the right direction. 
In considering choice of clothes with Subject 4, certain additional 
considerations were highlighted. Reference to Figure 7 (p.37) shows 
that the result for situation I was encouraging (Rs = 0.83), but 
situation 2 was less so (Rs = 0.576). An examination of the correlation 
calculations revealed that one element, "long hostess dress", 
contributed more than 50% of 2 d2 , the basis of the Spearman 
correlation coefficient. When asked to comment about this element in 
this situation, Subject 4 said: 
"It's got the right characteristics as far as these constructs 
are concerned -- it's just that it would be 'formally 
inappropriate', the wrong thing at the wrong time, like a 
dinner jacket in the morning. When I ranked them, I knew it had 
a lot of good points, it's just wrong for this occasion." 
I 
I 
I 
I 
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Similarly, in commenting about the element ITshort skirtn (which, again, 
contributed more than 50% of 2: d2 ) in relation to situation 3, the 
subj ect said: 
ITIt's a bit too constraining. I was thinking of a straight, 
short skirt, work-type skirt, and it's just not in the party 
spirit, it's nothing special, it's the sort of thing you'd 
wear every day.1T 
The problem here can be seen as one of sampling. The subject is saying 
that her decisions have been based on constructs which do not appear 
in the grig.. Hence the constructs do not form a representative sample 
of the relevant dimensions and as such cannot be expected to predict 
behaviour as accurately as might have been expected. It can also be 
seen as an element sampling problem insofar as an unrepresentative 
sample of elements will not allow the relevant constructs to emerge. 
A further problem which occasionally arises is that a subject may find 
it difficult to imagine a stereotype element with the given combination 
of properties. When this happens, it is sometimes possible to refer 
back to the grid and find an element which is nearest to the ideal 
position on the constructs under consideration. This element can then 
be used as a basis from which to work in defining a stereotype element. 
For example, supposing element X is the best fit, one could then ask 
the subject to think of an ideal element which is like X but with, say, 
more of property A. 
As one progresses up a hierarchy, the group of constructs to be 
considered gets progressively larger and therefore may be more difficult 
to envisage. One possible solution to this problem which may merit 
-47-
investigation would be to ask subjects to name the superordinate 
constructs represented by the nodes of the hierarchy. Thus, at each 
node the subject would only have two constructs to consider. As one 
progresses up a hierarchy, the degree of association (often measured 
as a percentage matching scorel ) between constructs or clusters 
decreases. Experience suggests that subjects have difficulty naming 
nodes which represent a matching score of less than 40%, and hence this 
should be remembered if node-naming is ,considered. 
Thus far, it has been assumed that if A-weights are obtained 
specifically in relation to a particular situation, it should be 
possible to predict choice behaviour in that situation. In fact, the 
data presented would seem to support this assumption, with the 
reservations and limitations already discussed. However, although it 
has been shown that situation-specific J\-weights enable situation-
specific predictions, it could be argued that anyone set of J\-weights 
obtained from a subject may predict behaviour in all situations. In 
order to negate this argument, it must be shown that )\-weights predict 
best in relation to the situation for which they were elicited. 
1. A percentage matching score, Q, between two sets of scores is 
calculated using the formula: 
Q = 
r x n 
2 
r x n 
---
2 
x 100% 
where 
r 
n 
d 
= 
= 
= 
range of scores 
no. of things rated 
difference between 
a pair of scores 
It should be noted that Humphreys and Humphreys (1975) attribute 
this formula to Mcquitty (1957) when in fact it was devised by 
Thomas specifically for use in"a grid-elicitation program (Thomas 
and Mendoza, 1970). 
1 
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Except in the case of Subj ect 2 who only considered a single situation, 
the data obtained allow investigation of this hy})othooio. Tho mothod 
is as follows: for each situation in turn, the predicted behaviour may 
be correlated with the actual behaviQur in all other situations. In this 
way a matrix of correlations between predicted choice and actual choice 
will be generated for each subject. If )\-weights predict best in 
relation to the specific situation for which they were elicited, then 
the fughest correlation in each row would be expected to lie on the 
diagonal of the matrix. Figures 12 - 18 show the correlations thus 
obtained. (Note: The diagonal of each matrix corresponds to the table 
of correlations already presented for that subject. Also, the matrices .. 
are not symmetrical about the diagonal since the relationship is not 
symmetrical, i.e., the relationship between the predicted behaviour in 
situation 1 and the actual behaviour in situation 3 is not necessarily 
the same as the relationship between the predicted behaviour in 
situation 3 and the actual behaviour in situation 1.) 
In order to simplify the process of scanning the matrices, the highest 
value in each row is indicated with an asterisk ( * ). 
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SUBJECT'S CHOICE 
SITUATION No. 
1 2 3 -4 -- 5 6 7 8 
.820 -.685 .cf52 -.891 -.648 .673 -.612 .891 
-.539 "* .951 -.745 .642 .927 -.855 .321 -.624 
.842 -.515 *" .976 -.988 -.612 .588 -.588 .842 
-.721 .709 -.879 .ls5 .739 -.588 .636 -.818 
-.527 .939 -.733 .588 * .904 -.891 .648 -.648 
.367 -.618 .479 -.273 -.709 .7~3 -.273 .697 
-.430 .770 -.709 .624 .782 -.661 .915 -.62.4 
.600 -.430 .794 -.745 -.527 .479 -.503 1< .903 
Table of correlations between predicted and actual 
choice across situations for Subject 1. 
SUBJECT'S CHOICE 
SITUATION No~ 
1 2 3 
· 
1 .564 .130 -.006 
0 .6~6 -.139 :z; 2 .479 
· E-t 
.101 H 3 .661 .358 CI) 
FIGURE 13 Table of correlations between predicted and actual 
choice across situ~tions for Subject 3. 
SUBJECT'S CHOICE 
SITUATION No. 
1 2 3 4 
1 ~""~ .479 .333 .830 -.212 
· 
.t76 ~ 2 .455 .515 -.176 
· .685 -.321 .600 E-t 3 .079 H 
CI) 
*" 4 .879 -.212 .503 .540 
FIGURE 14 Table of correlations between predicted and actual 
choice across situations for Subject 4. 
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SUBJECT'S CHOICE 
SITUATION No. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 .~OO .883 .cloo -.417 -.567 .800 .c!00 
2 .767 't .917 .817 -.183 -.833 .617 f' .917 
• 
.<toO -.467 -.250 ~ 3 .667 .583 .767 .667 
:z; 4 -.550 -.317 -.717 .t67 .067 -.317 -.433 0 
H !t E-i 5 -.533 -.750 -.533 -.067 .967 -.267 -.800 ~ p 
*" *" 
E-i 6 .800 .683 .917 -.517 -.217 .917 .717 H 
CI) 
.9'67 7 .833 .917 .833 -.217 -.783 .700 
FIGURE 15 Table of correlations between predicted and actual 
choice across situations for Subject 5. 
SUBJECT'S CHOICE 
SITUATION No. 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 .903 .067 .030 .067 .661 
'" .612 .418 -.261 
· 
2 -.115 .758 
~ 
.576 
1: 
3 .018 .855 .418 -.358 
· 
" 
E-i 
.406 H 4 -.285 .721 .818 -.006 CI) 
*" 5 .564 .079 -.552 .176 .915 
FIGURE 16 Table of correlations between predicted and actual 
choice across situations for Subject 6, element set 1. 
SUBJECT'S CHOICE 
SITUATION No. 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 .lJo .491 .176 .612 .479 
· 
2 .123 .452 .758 .842 -.152 
~ 3 -.042 *" .842 .782 .782 -.285 
• 
*" E-i 4 .091 .855 .673 .842 -.006 H 
CI) 
*" 5 .564 .297 -.055 .552 .745 
FIGURE 17 Table of correlations between predicted and actual 
choice across situations for Subject 6, element set 2~, 
I j j 
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SUBJECT'S CHOICE 
SITUATION No. 
1 2 3 4 5 
* .817 -.600 .417 .917 -.917 
-.850 .l83 ,...917 .567 -.850 
.883 -.767 *" .917 ~.583 .883 
* 
-.871 .829 -.629 .962 -.871 
* * .917 -.917 .817 -.600 .917 
Table of correlations between predicted and actual 
choice across situation~ for Subject 7. 
Again, since these data generally support the specificity assumption, 
attention will be turned to the instances where this is not the case. 
It can be seen that in the case of Subject 1 (Figure 12) only one row 
(situation 1) has its highest value off the diagonal. The easiest way 
to deal with such results is simply to dismiss them as 'error variance' 
or some such. However, it is possible that some of the error is 
explainable in terms of the subject's construing of the situations. 
That is, in cases where the highest value is off-diagonal, the subject 
might be expected to construe the two situations denoted by the highest 
value as similar. Hence in this case Subject 1 might be expected to 
construe situations 1 and 3 as being similar. 
"While the method does not involve direct construing of situations in 
a repertory grid sense, it does provide an operational definition of 
each situation from the subject's point of view, i.e., his rank 
ordering of the elements for each situation. Hence, some measure of 
perceived similarity may be derived by correlating the subject's choice 
in each of the two situations. In this case, the correlation between 
Subject lIs rank ordering for situations 1 and 3 = 0.891 and it may 
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be concluded that the subject does see the two situations as being 
qui te similar. 
In view of the fact that Subjects 3 and 4 presented particular 
difficulties already discussed, it seems likely that the cases where 
prediction is not optimal (Subject 3, situation 1; Subject 4, situations 
3 and 4) are mainly a result of these same difficulties. It is perhaps 
worth noting that even in each of these three cases, the diagonal 
contains the second-highest correlation in the row. 
In the case of Subject 5 (Figure 15) the diagonal contains the highest~ 
value in each row. However, in three situations (1, 2 and 6) other 
situations share first place. That is, the' A-weights obtained for 
situation 1 predict equally well for situations 3 and 7 in addition 
to situation 1; those obtained for situation 2 predict equally well 
for situation 7; and those obtained for situation 6 predict equally 
well for situation 3. 
Again, if the correlations between the subject's choices in these 
situations are considered, it can be seen that the subject is 
construing the situations similarly. The following are the values of 
the relevant correlations between the subject's choices: 
Situation 1 Vs Situation 3 Rs = 0.867 
Situation 1 Vs Situation 7 Rs = 0.900 
Situation 2 Vs Situation 7 Rs = 0.917 
Situation 6 Vs Situation 3 Rs = 0.767 
Similarly, the relevant correlations for Subject 6 
are as follows: 
Situation 3 Vs Situation 2 
Situation 4 Vs Situation 2 
Rs = 0.721 
Rs = 0.903 
(set 2 elements) 
1 
I 
L 
1 
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Again, in all these cases, the diagonal contains the second-highest 
correlation in the row. 
The data for Subject 7 (Figure 18) contain the best example of the 
argument that shared predictability follows similarity of construing. 
In situation 1, the A-weights predict situation 5 equally well, and 
in situation 5 the A-weights predict situation 1 equally well. If 
the subject's choices in these two sit-q,ations are 'correlated, the 
result is Rs = 1.0, i.e., the subject rank ordered the elements 
identically in the two situations and hence both must have equal 
predictability. 
III highlighting the row maximum, the data are being applied to the 
question: does anyone set of weights predict behaviour in all 
situations? However, it is also possible to ask a related question: 
given any situation, would some other set of weights predict 
behaviour equally well? In this case, it is the column maximum which "" 
should lie on the diagonal in order to support the specificity 
assumption. 
In 31 of a possible 37 cases, the row maximum lies on the diagonal. 
Additionally, in 32 of the 37 cases the column maximum lies on the 
diagonal. Hence, in both cases the data tend to support the 
specificity assumption. 
;':".7', .. 
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Two Further Variations on the Model 
As was stated earlier, the use of an elicited repertory grid is 
assumed to increase the meaningfulness and relevance of the 
dimensions. However, this assumption had not been tested directly. 
For this reason, Subjects 1 and 7 were asked to repeat the whole 
procedure with one small modification: dimensions were provided in 
the form of a set of nine typical 'semantic differential' scales 
(c.f. Osgood et al., 1957). 
Since there was no obvious basis for choosing scales, they were 
chosen randomly from the sub-set of 25 used by Humphreys (1972, p.58). 
The first of the scales used by Humphreys was selected followed by 
. 
every third scale, i.e., scales 1, 4, 7, 10 and so on, yielding the 
following list. 
1 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
Wise 
Strong 
Good 
Important 
Savory 
Ferocious 
Positive 
Graceful 
Correct 
Foolish 
Wen.k 
Bad 
Unimportant 
Tasteless 
Peaceful 
Negative 
Awkward 
Incorrect 
FIGURE 19 : Semantic differential scales used by Subjects 1 and 7. 
. . 
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For ease of comparison, the constructs of subjects 1 and 7 are 
presented here. 
1 Planned, leading somewhere Modular, self-contained 
2 Controlled, tight Loose, running away 
3 In touch Detached 
4 
rl 
Jerky Flowing 
E-; 5 Expressive Decorative 0 
f:iI 
I-;> g 6 Assaulting Gentle 
7 Airy, cheerful Earthy, solid 
8 Abstract About experience 
9 'Blues I Avant-garde 
10 Fluctuating mood Stable mood 
1 Story, novel, narrative Information 
2 Music Psychology 
3 Black and white Colour 
1:'-
E-; 4 Historical Contemporary 
0 
f:iI 
I-;> 5 Can be opened anywhere Beginning-to-end job (Xl 
t5 . , 6 Transient Lasting 
7 Many levels of meaning Straightforward 
8 Mostly 'distant' Can identify with 
FIGURE 20 Constructs used by Subjects 1 and 7. 
Figures 21 and 22 overleaf show the correlations between predicted 
and actual rank orders for the two dimensional systems. It can be seen 
that in all cases, predictions based on personal constructs are more 
accurate than predictions based on supplied dimensions. Furthermore, 
the predictions based on personal constructs are more consistent, as 
evidenced by the range of correlations obtained. 
1-- . 
I 
i 
1 
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CORRELATION (Rs) 
PERSONAL SEMANTIC 
PURPOSE CONSTRUCTS DIFFERENTIAL 
Cheer me up. 0.820 0.467 
Calm me down. 0.951 0.782 
Drive by. 0.976 0.394 
Background whilst working. 0.855 0.333 
Send me to sleep. 0.964 0.867 
Dance to. 0.733 0.648 
Background over dinner. 0.915 0.576 
Stranded on desert island with. 0.903 0.515 
FIGURE 21 Comparison of predictiveness of personal constructs and 
semantic differential scales for Subject 1. 
CORRELATION (Rs) 
PERSONAL SEMANTIC 
PURPOSE CONSTRUCTS DIFFERENTIAL 
... 
Read on the tube. 0.917 -0.700 
Read for escape. 0.883 0.800 
Cheer me up. 0.917 -0.067 
Give as a present. 0.962 0.633 
Keep up to date. 0.917 -0.450 
FIGURE 22 Comparison of predictiveness of personal constructs and 
semantic differential scales for Subject 7. 
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To provide a 'typical' set of dimensions is, of course, an extreme 
case since these 'typical' dimensions were taken from sets of 
dimensions designed to be of use in rating as wide a range of 'concepts' 
(elements) as possible (Osgood et. al., 1957; Osgood, 1969), rather 
than sets of 'concepts' homogenous with those used in the present 
study. However, it is quite likely that many psychological experiments 
have been carried out in similar conditions, where the experimenter's 
. 
view bears little systematic relationship to the subject's view. One 
would expect that prediction using semantic differential scales would 
improve if the scales used were highly correlated with the subject's 
constructs. However, it is unlikely that a set of semantic differential 
scales could be found which correlated highly with all subjects' 
constructs. 
The second variation on the model involved Subject 6 and has already 
been mentioned (p.41 ). There, 20 elements were divided into two sets, 
only one of which was used to elicit constructs. However, both sets 
were rated and both were ranked in relation to each situation. 
Edwards (personal communication) has suggested that once the relevant 
dimensions and weights have been ascertained, they can be applied to a 
further set of elements. For example, Gardiner and Edwards (1975) 
describe the development of a set of weighted dimensions relative to 
the allocation of planning permission in California.' In principle, 
these dimensions and weights could then be used to choose between a 
further set of applications, or a criterion value could be set below 
which applications would be rejected outright. Hence, the model could 
be used as a decioion aid in recurring situations. It can be seen that 
the data obtained from Subject 6 bear directly on this suggestion, and 
indeed can be taken as some measure of confirmation. 
1 
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The present author has reported various attempts to apply different 
weighting schemes to existing data (McKnight, 1974). Although this 
work is not rigorous enough for inclusion in the main body of the 
present thesis, it is included as Appendix B. The main failing of the 
earlier work is that direct rankings were not obtained when using 
ranks as weightings; rather, constructs were ranked on the basis of 
the weights obtained by the basic reference lottery ticket (brlt) 
method, thereby throwing away a lot of·the information from the brlts. 
In an attempt to redress this failing of the earlier work, three of 
the subjects described in the previous chapter were at some time asked 
to rank order their constructs in terms of importance for a particular 
purpose. All three attempted the task and all three complained that they 
could not arrive at a satisfactory ranking after about 20 minutes of 
trying. Before an explanation of this is offered, consider the 
following study. 
Gardiner and Edwards (1975) describe a method of weighting which is 
relevant here. Basically, their method is to ask people to rank order 
the dimensions being used and then to compare all possible pairs of 
dimensions on an importance dimension. Since all possible pairs are 
considered, internal consistency can be checked (in terms of 
preservation of ratios) and the subject presented with inconsistencies 
for reconsideration. 
The author was surprised to learn that Gardiner and Edwards have 
achieved some measure of success with their method since certain points 
arise. The first is that Fischer and Peterson (1972) reported a lack of 
success with such a method. Edwards (personal communication) considers 
the difference to lie in the fact that he requires subjects to 
-5~-
start the paired comparisons from the least important dimension 
whereas Fischer and Peterson started from the most important dimension. 
However, there is no theoretical reason why this should make any 
difference. 
Furthermore, this method requires the subject to make (n(n - 1))/2 
judgements whereas brlt methods require only n - 1 judgements (where 
n = number of constructs). Hence, it is more time-consuming and likely 
to be boring whereas brIts, although possibly difficult, .are likely to 
be interesting for reasons offered later. Gardiner and Edwards claim 
that 
" ••• unpublished studies strongly argue that the simple rating-
scale procedures described below produce results essentially the 
same as much more complicated procedures involving imaginary 
lotteries." (1975, p.13). 
Since this has not been substantiated by similar published studies 
(e.g., v.Winterfeldt and Edwards, 1973), brlts would seem to be the 
best method of weighting constructs. 
One reason why the hierarchical decomposition produces such good 
• L 
results may be because the hierarchy used is based on similarities 
between the dimensions under consideration. That is, the gambles map 
onto the cognitive structure implied by the grid and hence stand a good 
chance of being meaningful (and thereby interesting) to the subject. 
This may go some way towards explaining the current controversy over 
'direct' versus 'indirect' weighting methods (for an excellent 
discussion of this controversy, see Humphreys, 1975), and would seem 
to suggest that attempts should be made to make either method meaningful 
l __ if it is to be successful. 
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To return to the question of ranking, Gardiner and Edwards do not 
report any difficulties whereas present subjects seemed unable to 
rank constructs. This difference in ability between the subjects may 
be attributable to a difference in the nature of the 'stimuli' involved. 
To elaborate, subjects in the present study were asked to rank bi-polar 
constructs and were presented with both poles of each construct, e.g., 
"long -- short"; Gardiner and Edwards' subjects were presented with 
single descriptors of the dimensions, ~.g., "length". 
It may therefore be possible to abbreviate the constructs before asking 
subjects to perform the ranking operation. However, it should be noted 
that to perform internal consistency cross-checks would alter the nature 
of the enterprise as presented here. That is, such checks are for the 
benefit of the 'experimenter' and therefore make the process normative 
to some degree. While this is acceptable if the model is being used as 
a decision aid, it distorts the descriptive power of the model unless 
one assumes that people really are internally consistent in which 
case the 'fault' lies in the nature of the response device. 
Of course, the question still remains whether it is worth applying any 
weighting scheme. Several authors have argued and presented evidence 
to show that use of equal (or even random) weights produces reasonable 
predictions (Dawes and Corrigan, 1974; Einhorn and Hogarth, 1975; 
Wainer, 1976). It is worth noting that all these authors compared 
equal weights with regression models. In the present case regression 
is inappropriate since in most cases the number of constructs is greater 
than or equal to the number of elements and hence a set of weights can 
be found which will produce 'perfect' prediction. It has been shown 
that A-weights are purpose-specific, and hence there is no reason to 
i 
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believe that J3 -weights would not be purpose-specific. In fact, since 
)3 ...,weights capitalise on random variation in the data, they would 
probably not predict choice from a different set of elements in the 
sam~ situation on this basis alone, since the pattern of random 
variation will be different in the new sample of element ratings. 
However, it is possible that equal weights might perform well in the 
present case, particularly in the light of the suggestion that the 
weighting problem is subsidiary to the problem of specifying relevant 
variables (Dawes and Corrigan, 1974; Einhorn and Hogarth, 1975). Since 
personal constructs are taken to be maximally relevant, is it worth 
weighting them? 
The question is an empirical one to which the data presented in the 
previous chapter can be applied. For this reason, predictions based 
on equal weights were correlated with actual choice for all subjects. 
These correlations can then be compared with those obtained using 
A -weights, as shown in Figure 23. 
(Note: The equal weights predictions are based on the preferred pole 
grids rather than the raw grids. This obviates use of what Einhorn 
and Hogarth (op. cit.) call l1unit weights" of +1.0 or -1.0, a special 
case of equal weights, and is also compatible with Dawes and Corrigan 
(op_ Cit.) who specified the direction of the weight even when its 
size was randomly determined.) 
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A-WEIGHTS' 
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0.964 
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FIGURE 23 Comparison of correlations obtained using A-ueights and 
equal ueights (... indicates case uhere equal ueights 
give better prediction than A-ueights). 
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In 28 out of 38 cases (or approximately 75% of the time), prediction 
using A -weights is b~tter than predictio~ using equal weights. Hence, 
the use of A -weights would seem to be justified. However, it is 
interesting to note that the equal-weights correlations are generally 
quite high. Taken in conjunction with the 'semantic differential' 
results presented earlier (p.5G), this would seem to reinforce the 
view that the selection of constructs is more important than weighting 
them. However, if the aim is to produc~ an optimal descriptive system, 
then equally-weighted personal constructs can be seen as a first 
approximation and weighting has a positive contribution to make to 
such an approximation. 
Hence, the findings of Dawes and Corrigan regarding random weights 
can perhaps best be interpreted in the light of their own comments. 
They say "The whole trick is to decide what variables to look at!! (1974, 
p.105). Given an appropriate set of variables, random weights may 
perform reasonably, but properly-elicited weights would be expected to 
perform even better. Given an inappropriate set of variables, choice 
of weighting schemes is arbitrary. 
Construct Weighting and Personality 
In Chapter 1 it was suggested that the model may have applicability 
in the area of personality, and it is this suggestion which will now 
• L 
be considered. Essentially, the suggestion is that different 
personalities may express themselves in different styles of decision 
making; furthermore, I style I may be characterised as certain parameter-
combinations within the model. 
However, before proceeding there is a problem which should be borne in 
J-~-
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mind concerning A-weights. As was stated earlier (p. 9) A-weights 
are components of value-wise importance weights and relative scaling 
factors which cannot be separated. Speculations about the cognitive 
basis of personality will concern value-wise importances, not 
A -weights. If it was possible to control relative scaling such that 
it was kept constant, arguments could be based on A-weights; but such 
control is not possible. Hence, speculations are likely to be 
approximate at best, and should be treated as such. 
Consider, then, the behaviours which might be expected to result from 
various 'extreme' patterns of weightings. If all constructs are weighted 
equall~, then choice would become difficult since, in real life, most 
choice objects have both positive and negative aspects. Hence, a person 
who weights all constructs equally would appear to an observer to be 
very unsure; such a person would be continually weighing pro's and 
con's without doing much. Furthermore, if such behaviour extended over 
a variety of situations, the person might find life difficult. Indeed, 
if clinical reports are acceptable data here, then there exists a class 
of people seeking help who are characterised by such behaviour and who 
frequently describe themselves as 'without purpose' or 'aimless' 
(e.g., Ryle, 1975). 
From a clinical point of view, it is important to distinguish such 
1. The suggestion here is different from that discussed earlier in the 
context of the work of Dawes and Corrigan (1974) and Einhorn and 
Hogarth (1975). Earlier, the term 'appropriate variables' was used 
to suggest that a certain set of constructs have unit weights, the 
implication being that remaining constructs have zero weights. Here, 
the suggestion is that all (or a large number of) constructs have 
equal, non-zero weights. 
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people from depressive patients who, given their existing construct 
system, cannot reconcile contradictions between preferences and " 
desires. They are therefore 'without purpose' since they are unable 
to formulate a purpose which is not immediately contradicted by some 
other purpose or consequence. 
Incidentally, such a formulation may offer a means of distinguishing 
between cognitive complexity (Bieri, 1961) and schizophrenic thought 
disorder (Bannister, 1960), since 'complexity' and 'confusion' seem 
to bear many similarities. In the present ,terms, confusion would be 
characterised by unstable weights over a large number of constructs, , . 
whereas complexity would be characterised by stable weights over a 
large number of constructs. 
Similarly, the description of the "authoritarian personality" presented 
by Adorno and co-workers (1950) can be interpreted within the framework 
of the model. Typically, the description of the authoritarian person 
suggests a refusal to adjust the weightings of certain key constructs 
over situations. Hence, a construct such as 'good -- bad' is carried 
into all situations and weighted highly. Furthermore, Adorno's work 
suggests that constructs tend to be used in an 'either/or' sense with 
no possible mid-position. 
An interesting property of measures of authoritarianism is that they 
have thus far failed to correlate with a wide variety of current 
indices of decision making behaviour (Wright, 1976; Wright and Phillips, 
1976). Hence, the present model may offer a method of investigating 
the concept within a decision theoretic framework. 
-bb-
In considering personality it is usually the movement of weightings 
(or lack of it) across situations which is interesting, since it is 
difficult to make inferences from static patterns of weightings. To 
illustrate this point, consider the 'major construct' results included 
in Appendix B (p.i'1) where the particular subject's behaviour was 
based almost totally on one construct. Presented with only this datum, 
it may have been tempting to attribute to that subject traits like 
'single-mindedness', 'monolithic construing' and so forth. However, 
the subject also demonstrated that he brought other (and more) 
constructs to bear at different times. Hence, the construing/weighting 
combination is the subject's approach to the situation given a specific 
purpose, rather than a rigidity of construing/weighting across 
. , 
si tua tions. 
It has been argued that since both PCT and MAUT are contentless, the 
model should be applicable ,to a wide range of behaviours. The above 
paragraphs indicate how the model can be used to conceptualise certain 
types of behaviour and it may therefore prove instructive to see how 
far claims for the model's generality can be taken. 
It can be argued that decisions underly all purposive activity since 
there is usually more than one way to achieve any goal. The question ,_, 
is: Can the model be applied to any such situation? In principle, the 
answer to this question would seem to be 'yes'. For example, a military 
general choosing a plan of action is considering alternatives; 
furthermore, the constructs in terms of which he considers such 
alternatives will be differentially important. Similarly, a teacher 
compiling a course of instruction can be viewed in terms of the model, 
as can a parent buying a pet for a child, or an athlete working out a 
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training schedule. 
As Edwards and Tversky say: 
liMen make choices. They choos~ what to have for dinner, whom to 
marry, whether or not to make war.1I (1967, p.7). 
What is argued here is that the same process is involved in all these 
activities. In view of this claimed generality, a previously unexplored 
area was sought in which to apply the ~odel. The area chosen was the 
sentencing of offenders in Magistrates' courts and Chapter 5 documents 
this application. 
(Retrospectively, it can be seen that the model could also have been 
used to prescribe the choice of area of application, given the 
perceived set of viable alternativesl) 
SUMMARY 
The main points thus far may be suoonarised as follows: , , 
The repertory grid is a useful way of describing a person's beliefs 
about an area. However, elicitation of the grid presents 'sampling' 
problems in that, if the elicited elements do not fully represent 
the area then the relevant constructs may not be elicited. 
Raiffa's multi-attributed utility model can be successfully combined 
with an elicited grid in order to predict wholistic choice behaviour. 
Furthermore, the A-weights have been shown to be situation-specific. 
However, the brlt method of eliciting A-weights, although effective, 
tends to be tedious. Direct assessment of weights would only seem to 
be feasible with a small number of constructs. Also, the work of 
Fischer and Peterson (1972) suggests that a possible failing in direct 
J 
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assessment is that the ratio of largest weight : smallest weight is 
too small. This suggestion is supported by the present study. 
. , 
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CHAPTER 5 
THE MAGISTRATE STUDY 
l 
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Previous studies of decision making related to the legal system have 
tended to focus on the question of guilt in the light of evidence 
(e.g. Goldsmith, 1973). Typically, the decision maker is presented w~th 
evidence ina numerical form and his use of this evidence is compared 
with some model of optimum use, e.g., Bayes' theorem. 
The present study begins with the assumption that the accused has been 
declared guilty, either on his own admission or in the opinion of the 
Bench. The magistrate must now select a sentence from a range of 
possible sentences, and it is this choice decision with which the 
present investigation is concerned. 
Devlin (1970) suggests five aims of the penal system, these being: 
a) retribution, b) individual deterrence, c) general deterrence, 
d) protection of the public, and e) rehabilitation. In view of this 
it is hypothesised that any particular magistrate will have different 
purposes in sentencing different cases. Operationally, the hypothesis 
is that, as previously, weights on constructs will change from case 
to case. 
If the legal system leaves room for personal construing and if 
sentencing behaviour is based on this construing, then it would seem 
reasonable to expect magistrates to differ in their behaviour. Hence, 
it is hypothesised that there will be differences between magistrates 
in terms of sentencing behaviour. 
Methodological Considerations 
In view of the fact that magistrates tend to be very busy people, it 
was decided to simplify the design as much as possible in order to 
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minimise the time requirement. To this end, a set of ten sentences 
were selected as providing a reasonable cross-section of available 
sentences, and these were provided as elements to all magistrates who 
took part in the study. These sentences were: 
1) Absolute discharge. 
2) Conditional discharge, 1 year. 
3) Probation, 1 year. 
4) Fine £5. 
5) Fine £25. 
6) Fine £100. 
7) Imprisonment, 1 month. 
8) Imprisonment, 3 months. 
9) Imprisonment, 6 months. 
10) Crown Court committal. 
Furthermore, only three situations were considered, these being 
provided in the form of case histories. Case 1 involved a fairly 
trivial case of shop-lifting; case 2 involved the threatening use of 
a kp~fe under the influence of drink; and case 3 involved larceny of 
a valuable piece of silverware. The cases are presented in full as 
Appendix C. 
It was felt that by providing elements and considering only three 
cases, a single session of approximately 2t hours would be sufficient. 
In view of this, it was not feasible to cluster analyse the 'constructs 
into hierarchical form. The initial intention had been to provide an 
arbitrary hierarchy based on perceived cimilarity (i.e., on the basis 
of what is known as an t eyeball analysis I). However, a pilot study 
indicated that presentation of gambles in relation to sentencing 
\Jould be viewed by magistrates as ludicrous. 
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In view of the fact that the method does not include formal 
consistency checks, it is all the more important that the subject's 
task should be as meaningful as possible. For this reason it was 
decided not to present gambles but to obtain direct assessments of 
the ~-weights. This was done by asking the subjects to rank order 
their constructs. They were then asked to consider the most and least 
important constructs as lying at opposite ends of a 10-point scale 
. 
(10 = most important) and to place the remaining constructs along 
this scale according to their relative importance. It was felt that 
ranking would provide the required meaningfulness while a magnitude 
ratio of 10:1 would provide the discrimination required while placing 
minimal demands on the subject. 
A further variation was that constructs were not elicited by triadic 
presentation of elements. Again, the pilot study had indicated that 
such a form of presentation would reduce the meaningfulness of the 
task. That is, given three sentences and asked to say in which way 
two were similar and thereby different from the third, most 
magistrates would probably find it hard to consider the question 
seriously. 
Hence, constructs were elicited 'conversationally', i.e., subjects 
were asked to talk about the various properties of sentences, what 
made an ideal sentence, and so forth. Following thiS, the ideas which 
the subject had expressed were offered back, in identical words where 
possible, as the basis of dimensions along which sentences could vary. 
For example, a magistrate might mention the rehabilitative aspect of 
sentences. He would later be offered the term "rehabilitative" as one 
pole of a dimension and asked what the other pole would be. The reply 
1 
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to this question was usually of the form "not rehabilitative" and the 
magistrate was then asked if he could construe sentences as varying 
along such a dimension. If so, the construct was added to his pool of 
constructs~ 
When construct elicitation was completed, ideal points were 
determined by asking the subject to think about, Case 1 and to state 
at which pole their ideal sentence wobld lie for each construct, or 
whether it would lie somewhere inbetween the poles. This was then 
repeated for each case in turn. All subjects stated a pole, thereby 
obviating the need to fold constructs about the ideal point. However, 
one magistrate seemed to have an intuitive grasp of ideal points and 
fblding since, when rating the elements on a particular construct for 
a given case, he rated his preferred sentence lower than two other 
sentences; he then said that this did not make sense -- his preferred 
sentence must be rated higher than the others because he preferred it 
to the others. He then proceeded without prompting to effectively 
fold the construct about his preferred element by rating it 5 and 
moving the other two sentences down to 4. As far as is known, all 
magistrates were naive with respect to decision theory. 
The pilot study also indicated that the ratings of elements were 
likely to change from case to case. This was not surprising since it 
seems intuitively reasonable that, for example, a probation sentence 
may be rehabilitative in some cases but would be laughed at by 
certain offenders. Hence, before rating elements on each construct, 
subjects were asked whether or not the ratings on the construct in 
question would change from case to case. If they answered in the 
affirmative, they were asked to rate the elements specifically in 
relation to each case in turn. 
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It should be noted that this represents a significant extension to 
the model. As used in Chapter 3, the model assumed that 'beliefs' 
were held constant and 'values' changed across situations (p.43 ). 
However, as use~ here, the model assumes a more dynamic state of 
affairs in which both beliefs and values change across situations. 
Earlier (p.58 ) it was stated that three subjec~s found it impossible 
to rank order constructs, and the suggestion was then made (p.60 ) 
that this was because constructs were presented in their bipolar form. 
Hence, when magistrates were asked to rank order their constructs, 
they were presented with a single description of each construct, e.g., 
IIrehabilitationll, each written on a separate card. The fact that 
magistrates were able to perform the ranking under these conditions 
can be taken as support for the earlier suggestion. 
The subjects reported in this chapter were all magistrates. Subjects 
1 to 8 sat on a West Middlesex Bench and Subject 9 sat on a 
Buckinghamshire Bench. Subjects 1, 2, 4 and 7 were male, and all 
subjects were in the age range 35 - 65. Subjects offered their 
services on a voluntary b~sis and no payment was ever mentioned or 
ofi'~red. 
The methodology may be summarised as f~llows: 
1) Present subjects with list of available sentences (elements). 
2) Subject reads case histories (Appendix C) and, for each case 
in turn, rank orders the elements in terms of preference. 
(The rank orders for all subjects are presented as Appendix D). 
3) Constructs elicited conversationally. 
4) Preferred poles of constructs determined for each case. 
" . 
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Since all magistrates considered what were ostensibly the same three 
case histories and chose from the same set of sentences, various inter-
subject comparisons may be made. 
Experimenter's Impressions 
What was immediately obvious was the range of reactions to the case 
histories. For example, in case I some magistrates expressed the view 
that the public should be protected since it was they who 'paid' for 
such ~rime in the form of higher prices; on the other hand, the view 
was expressed that supermarkets bring such action upon themselves by 
the nature of their displays; or that the defendant needed support 
over a difficult period. 
Similarly, in case 2, some magistrates focussed on the fact that the 
defendant had threatened with a knife, some saw the whole matter as 
J fairly trivial, and others suggested that the defendant may have an 
incipient drink problem for which treatment and support would be 
appropriate. 
The second major impression was that, although the same words were 
used time and again in construing, the meaning of the words varied to 
quite an extent. That is, although most magistrates mentioned, for 
example, the rehabilitative aspect of sentences, they differed in the 
extent to which they attributed rehabilitative properties to the 
sentences. 
Qua~titative Treatment of Data, and Discussion 
If magistrates do focus on different aspects of the cases, then they 
might be expected. to d.iffer in their sentencing of each case. The 
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For case 1, the range of correlations is 0.291 to 0.988. If the mean 
correlation is taken as a rough measure of agreement, then in this 
case the agreement is reasonably high (mean Rs = 0.739). 
For case 2, the mean corr,elation is lower (mean Rs = 0.519) and the 
range is greater (-0.224 to 0.976). Case 3 would seem to be the one 
about which there is most agreement since the mean correlation is high 
(mean Rs = 0.811) and the range is smaller than fer the other two 
cases (0.539 to 1.0). 
Hence, within anyone case magistrates may vastly differ (e.g., subjects 
1 and 4, case 2) or may completely agree (e.g., subjects 2 and 3, case 
3). Since the cases allow such a range of responses, it is to the 
credit of the Kelly/Ra1ffa model that predictions are as good as they 
are. 
'It is difficult to discuss agreement or disagreement with reference 
to a correlation matrix. However, since magistrates rank ordered the 
sentences a further analysis may be carried out. 'Consider the 
.f'cllowing argument. 
For each magistrate considering a particular case, the ordinal 
'distance' between any two sentences can be specified in terms of the 
number of intervening ranks in the preference ordering. Hence, a 
confusion matrix (Kruskal, 1964) can be'generated for each magistrate 
in relation to each case, this matrix containing the distance between 
each sentence and every other sentence. 
If such a matrix was subjected to multi-dimensional scaling, the 
. ' 
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original uni-dimensional ordering would of course be recovered. That 
is, a matrix generated thus must of necessity scale perfectly in one 
dimension. 
If the confusion matrices of all magistrates in relation to a 
particular case are considered, a 'group confusion matrix' may be 
generated by taking the mean inter-sentence dis,tances. This group 
matrix may then be subjected to multi~dimensional scaling and the 
extent to which it fails to scale in one dimension represents a 
measure of disagreement within the group. 
The goodness of fit of a multi-dimensional scaling solution to the 
data can be expressed in terms of what Kruskal (1964) calls 'stress'; 
the larger the stress, the worse the fit to the data. Hence, the 
stress associated with a one-dimensional scaling of a group confusion 
matrix represents a measure of the disagreement within the group in 
relation to the case in question. 
On the basis of this argument, group confusion matrices were 
generated for each case and these are presented as Appendix E. These 
matrices were then subjected to multi-dimensional scaling using 
program KYSTI (Kruskal, Young and Seory, 1972) and solutions were 
sought in 1 to 3 dimensiops. The following table shows the stress 
associated with each solution in each case. 
1. The author is greatly indebted to Peter Whalley for his help in 
running this program. Following Smith, Shoben and Rips (1974) a 
Euclidean distance metric was chosen. 
.." 
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Dimensions 
1 2 3 
1 0.119 0.008 0.008 
Q) 
2 0.209 0.013 0.008 rJl t'd 
0 
3 0.067 0.014 0.009 
FIGURE 27 Table of stress associated with multi-dimensional 
scaling solutions of group confusion matrices • 
. -
It can be seen that there is most disagreement about Case 2, with· 
less disagreement about Case 1 and least disagreement about Case 3. 
Hence, the statements made earlier (p.78) on the basis of the 
correlation matrices are supported. 
Furthermore, Kruskal (1964) also presents guidelines for interpreting 
the value of the stress associated with a solution, as shown in the 
following table. 
Stress Goodness of fit 
0.2 Poor 
0.1 Fair 
0.05 Good 
0.025 Excellent 
0.0 Perfect 
FIGURE 28 Interpretation of stress values. 
(Adapted from Kruskal, 1964, p~3) 
Hence the disagreement over Case 2 is sufficient to yield a "poor" 
one-dimensional solution, whereas the solution for Case 1 is "fair" 
and that for Case 3 is "good/fair". The question of disagreement will 
be returned to later in the present chapter (p.89 ). 
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Since all magistrates considered the same sentences, each construct 
may be compared Yith every other construct in terms of their 
treatment of the elements. Of the 1749 between-subject correlations, 
only two indicate identical ordering of the elements. Each of these 
two will now be considered. 
The first concerns Subject 2 and Subj~ct 4. A correlation of 1.0 was 
;"') 
obtained between Subject 2's construct 1 and Subject 4's construct 2 
in relation to Case 3. In terms of the words used, this means that 
Subject 2's use of the te:rm "protection of public" is identical to 
Subj ect 4' s use of the term "individual deterrent". The situation is 
further confounded by the fact that Subject 2 employs the term 
"individual deterrent" and Subject 4 uses the term "protection of 
others". Hence , at times these tW9 subj ects use the same words 
differently and at other times use.different words in the same way. 
Similarly, a correlation of 1.0 was obtained between Subject 3's 
construct 1 and Subject 6's construct 1, both constructs being specific 
to case 3. In terms of words used, Subject 3's "short, sharp shock" is 
identical to Subject 6's "help" in relation to case 3. However, Subject 
3 also uses the term "help" and Subject 6 uses the term "short, sharp 
shock". Hence, these two subjects use the same words differently and 
different words in the same way. 
Earlier (p.7 ) Duck's work on friendship formation was criticised 
because he used verbal similarity to indicate similarity of construing. 
The present data indicate the danger involved in such an enterprise, 
particularly in view of the high verbal agreement between all subjects 
in construing. 
r 
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It is only because subjects have common elements that construing 
across subjects may be compared; but a list of 1749 such correlations 
is not very instructive. However, Thomas, McKnight and Shaw (1976) 
offer a method of comparing any two Erids which have common elements. 
The method involves hierarchical cluster analysis of the constructs 
of a pair of grids considered as a single grid. On the basis of tr~s 
analysis it is possible to arrange the total array of constructs such 
that each construct is more like its immediate neighbours than any 
other constructs. Given such an array, what is of interest is the 
degree to which the two sets of constructs are intermingled. Hence, 
the occurrence of adjacent constructs from different grids is noted 
and weighted with the level of match at which the two constructs are 
connected in the hierarchy. The values thus obtained are summed and 
the resultant sum represents a measure of the degree of similarity 
between the two sets of constructs. 
However, since the maximum value of this sum depends on the number of 
constructs in each grid, it is scaled to lie between a maximum of 1.0 
;') 
and a minimum of 0.0. In this way, some degree of comparability is 
obtained between similarity scores. It should be noted that the 
method is such that the probability of obtaining a similarity score 
close to 1.0 is low, i.e., the distribution of similarity scores is 
skewed. 
Using this technique, a similarity matrix may be generated which 
relates each magistrate's grid with every other magistrate's grid. 
The following table shows the result of such an analysis. 
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If this matrix is subjected to hierarchical cluster analysist, the 
following hierarchy results: 
0.0 
0.1 /' 
>i 0.2 E-I .----.~ ~ "-. ~ 0.3 ~ , 
tI) /.~. . 0.4 
0.5 /\ /\ /\ Grid from 
Magistrate No. 8 4 6 9 3 ? 1 5 
FIGUP~ 30 Hierarchical cluster analysis of inter-subject 
similarity measures. 
2 
1. It would also be possible to cluster analyse the three matrices 
presented earlier as Figure 26 (p.?7 ). However, such analyses 
would not allow comparisons of magistrates across cases. 
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Two interesting observations may be made on the basis of this hierarchy. 
The first concerns Subject 9, who differed from the other subjects in 
that she sat on a different Bench. To the limited extent that such a 
statement can be made on the basis of these data, it may be stated that 
construing would not seem to be 'Bench-specific' in that Subject 9 does 
not construe in a manner vastly different to the other subjects. 
The second point concerns Subject 2 who appears to be the 'outsider' of 
the group. This is interesting because Subject 2 was unsure about his 
sui tabili ty as a subj ect in view of hi s limited experience -- he had' L 
only been a magistrate for about four months and had not yet undergone 
training, the other subjects having had at least four years experience. 
From time to time considerable anxiety is expressed in the newspapers 
and elsewhere at what is regarded as inconsistent sentencing by 
magistrates' courts. Devlin (1971) reported the effect of varying 
several legal factors (previous convictions, etc.) on the sentencing 
process, but his results are presented as averages across subjects and 
therefore can only be taken to indicate trend (c.f. the average 
correlations presented earlier (p.78)). However, the present method 
allows consideration of individuals and comparisons between individuals. 
Furthermore, if the primary focus of concern was the sentencing process 
we could pin-point the areas of agreement and disagreement between 
magistrates, either in terms of constructs used or the importance 
attached to such constructs. 
Hence, if the aim of the legal system is to reduce variability between 
magistrates, the method could be used as an integral part of training 
to make explicit the belief/value system and to measure deviation from 
f 
1 
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the standard. Even if this is not the aim of the legal system, it 
would seem to occur informally, as evidenced by the hierarchy presented 
above (Figure 30). If the exercise was to be repeated in two years, 
Subject 2 would probably be seen to be integrated into the group. 
Hence, understanding between people is equivalent to shared construing 
(c.f. Kelly's commonality corollary: "To the extent that one person 
employs a construction of experience vhich is similar to that employed 
by another, his processes are psychologically similar to those of the 
other person." See also, Thomas et. al.(1976)). Formulated in this 
way it can be seen that arguments about subjectivity and objectivity 
resolve themselves. There is no longer a strict dichotomy; rather, the 
two terms indicate opposite poles of a dimension, 'objectivity' 
indicating totally shared qonstruing and 'subjectivity' indicating no 
shared construing. Similarly, the act of teaching can be seen as an 
attempt to produce shared construing and hence formal learning can be 
measured as the degree of overlap between the learner's and teacher's 
construct systems. 
Validation Revisited 
Newman (1975) has suggested that the theory of generalizability 
(Cronbach et. al., 1972) can be used to 'validate' MAUT procedures. 
His suggestion is based on the argument that observations produced by 
MAUT techniques should be generalizable to a larger population of which 
the individual is a part. The method of testing this involves applying 
an analysis of variance; low generalizability is indicated by, for 
example, situatio~subject interaction effects accounting for a large 
part of the total variance. 
. , 
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However, it is contended that such validation is inappropriate in the 
present case. The Kelly/Raiffa model was chosen because there were 
individual differences in behaviour, these differences having been 
demonstrated earlier (p.80 ), and it was hoped that the model would 
be sensitive to such differences. The corollary to this sensitivity 
is, of necessity, a lack of generalizability. H~nce, if the model is 
to be validated relative to the purpose of its· u~e, a high subject/ 
case interaction should be found. (Note: If the model was being used 
as described earlier as an integral part of training, Newman's 
arguments about validation would be appropriate. Indeed, they are 
appropriate in all cases where agreement is sought or valued. However, 
MAUT is being used increasingly precisely because of its sensitivity 
to individual differences.) 
Since an analysis of variance model is inappropriate for the data 
under consideration, multi-dimensional unfolding1 was attempted 
using program KYST. It would not make sense to attempt unfolding 
<tcross cases since magistrates are expected to view sentences 
differently for each case (p.72 ); an unfolding across cases would 
soek a comIUon 'sentence space'. Hence, unfolding was attempted within 
each case. However, the solutions obtained were degenerate with 
magistrates densely clustered and closest to non-preferred sentence'8. 
This was presumably due to insjlfficient data for the analysis; with 
1. For a concise description of multi-dimensional unfolding, see 
Coombs, Dawes and Tversky (1970, p.55). Unfolding theory was 
specifically developed for the analysis of preferential choice 
data (Coombs, 1950). 
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only nine magistrates there is insufficient variability in the data 
to enable the magistrates to be separated and a sensible solution to 
be found. 
Hence, multi-dimensional scaling was applied to the data, again using 
program KYST. For this purpose, a correlation matrix was generated by 
, 
correlating each sentence ranking wit~ every other sentence ranking, 
yielding a 27 x 27 half-matrix (i.e., from Appendix D each row 1s 
correlated with every other row). Since scaling was attempted, it was 
reasonable to operate across cases sin~e magistrates are expected· to 
work within a common framework - the "legal system". 
Solutions were sought in 1 to 4 dimensions, and the stress for each 
solution was as follows: 
1 dimension 0.068 
2 dimensions 0.046 
3 dimensions :. 0.031 
4 dimensions 0.022 
In view of the fact that all these values are acceptably low, the 
one-dimensional and two-dimensional solutions only will be considered 
since interpretation of three-dimensional and four-dimensional 
solutions is increasingly difficult. 
The one-dimensional solution is presented overleaf (Figure 31) in 
terms of the cases which the points represent. It can be seen that 
the three cases separate out quite well. Only two points (those 
indicated by arrows) are 'out of case'. (Note: Where several points 
coincide, these points are written in a vertical column.) 
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The dimension would seem to be interpretablel in terms of severity of 
sentencing, with low values to the right (Case 1) and high values to 
the left (Case 3). 
Considering the two-dimensional solution, two methods of display are 
possible. If all points representing Case 1 are joined a polygon is 
formed. By joining Case 2 points to e~ch other and Case 3 points to 
each other, three such polygons are formed (Figure 32). Alternatively, 
if the three points representing each magistrate are joined, nine 
triangles are formed (Figure 33). Hence, Figures 32 and 33 contain 
the same points; only the method of representation differs. 
Considering Figure 32, dimension 1 (X-axis) is of' course almost 
identical with the one-dimensional solution and hence is interpretable 
in the same way. Furthermore, the 'spread
' 
of each case on dimension 1 
is as would be expected from earlier analyses (pp. 78 &80). Case 3 
has least spread and Case 2 has most spread, representing the 
relative amounts of disagreement within cases •. 
The interpretation of dimension 2 (Y-axis) is more difficult and the 
relative amounts of spread do not help. Cases 2 and 3 have equal 
spread and Case 1 slightly less. If the points are collapsed onto 
1. In considering interpretation of dimensions, the general theme of 
the theSis should be borne in mind, i.e., such interpretations 
represent the experimenter's construct system, or possibly the 
experimenter's view of the subjects' construct systems. It would 
obviously be preferable to enlist the help of subj ects in 
interpreting such dimensions but in the present case this was not 
feasible and hence 'projective identification' must be undertaken. 
-90-
o 
• C\l 
+ 
l(\ 
r-I • 
CD ~ 
Ol 
ro 
0 
0 
• ~ 
/" 
I l(\ 
C\l I , • I .. ~ CD I I 
U). I 
ro I 0 I ~ I I I 
I 0 
· I 0 , ; I' 
I I 
I I 
I I I 
I I , 
I 
--. , I 
l(\ ... I ... 
• ... C"'\ 0 , , I , CD 
• Ol \ 
\ ro 
\ 0 
0 
• 
'1 
o o 
• . o 
'1 
FIGURE 32 : Two-dimensional scaling solution (by cases). 
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this dimension it can be seen that, in general, Case 2 lies above 
Cases 1 and 3. Hence, the problem is to discover some way in which 
Cases 1 and 3 are similar and thereby' different from Case 2. 
Reference to the cases (Appendix C) shows that Cases 1 and 3 are both 
'crimes of property' -- they both involve larceny. On the other hand, 
Case 2 involves what is potentially a. 'crime against the person'. 
Hence, it is possible that this dimension represents severity of 
crime, since most people would agree that crimes against the person 
are more severe than crimes of property. 
The fact that there is not a great deal of overlap between the 
polygons can be taken to mean that tha cases are discriminably 
different. Also, if the legal system was totally prescriptive each 
polygon would be collapsed to a point. Hence, although the magistrat~ 
agree in the sense that they separate the cases, there is room for 
personal construing and hence disagreement within cases. 
This disagreement is highlighted in Figure 33. It can be seen that 
some magistrates are represented by large triangles while others are 
represented by relatively smaller or long and thin triangles. 
Such results suggest that the Kelly/Raiffa model would have fared 
badly if validated in accorqance with the theory of generalizability. 
Conversely, the model would need to be insensitive to individual 
differences in order to fare well in such a validation and hence 
would not produce such accurate predictions of choice behaviour. 
. . 
CHAPTER 6 
SOME IMPLICATIONS AND SPECULATIONS 
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In view of the foregoing results, the Kelly/Raiffa model would seem 
to be useful in predicting certain classes of decision making behaviour. 
In this chapter, some implications of the model are suggested and some 
speculations on future use are offered. 
Implications of peT for MAUT 
Raiffa recognised the difficulty in arriving at a relevant sample of 
dimensions, and the repertory grid offers .a way around the difficulty. 
The MAUT procedure is strengthened by the use of personally relevant 
dimensions. There are also historical precedents to S11ggest that this 
is a desirable direction for decision theory to move in. The two most 
influential developments in the history of decision theory have both 
involved increasing the degree to which the theory takes account of 
individuals, i.e., the move from 'expected value' to 'expected utility' 
and from 'objective' to 'subjective' probability, yielding the 
powerful Subjective Expected Utility (SEU) model. 
In fact, since decisions underly most behaviour, decision theory should 
occupy a central position in psychology. The fact that it does not 
occupy such a position suggests that, as it stands, decision theory does 
not offer a means of conceptualising many psychological phenomenal. It 
1. The author has also received a suggestion from a psychologist working 
within decision theory which places responsibility with psychologists 
rather than the model. That is, many psychologists seem to resist 
axiomatic theories, possibly because a) they have to learn a lot 
before they are in a position to state their own 'mini-extension' 
to the theory, and b) it is extremely difficult to 'waffle' within 
an axiomatic theory. The suggestion is an interesting one, even if 
a little cynical. 
J 
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has already been suggested that the model has broad applicability 
across situations. However, the model is also applicable to different 
concepts within psychology~ To illustrate this, two novel applications 
of the model are later presented as possible re-formulations of the 
established concepts of 'attention' and 'role'. 
Implications of MAUT for PCT 
The main implication that MAUT has for.PCT is that it moves it out 
of the solely descriptive sphere into the predictive sphere. The 
concept of a weighted construct suggests action much more strongly 
than an unweighted construct. Furthermore, the addition of MAUT 
techniques increases the areas in which the grid can be used to measure 
change since a person's values may change without any change in 
construing. To date, most measures of importance of constructs have 
been based on order of elicitation or frequency of repetitiion (c.f. 
Reid, 1976). MAUT techniques offer a way of extending the notion of 
importance of constructs. 
Implications of Purpose/Situation Specificity 
Perhaps the most important ,implication of the addition of purpose to 
the Kelly/Raiffa model is that it makes explicit a relationship which 
has remained implicit for SO long. That is, the concept of utility is 
only really meaningful in relation to the goal or purpose of the 
decision maker. The utility of a hammer is high if one is trying to 
hang a picture but low if one is repairing a watch. Although this fact 
has been implicitly recognised for a long time, it has been largely 
ignored experimentally by studying static, single-goal conditions. 
[ 
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With the addition of situation specificity, the model can be seen 
to have increased applicability to dynamic decision situations. Dynamic 
decision situations are characterised by sequential decision making 
under changing circumstances, changing values, and changing information 
(see Rapoport, 1975). With interactive computer back-up, the model 
could provide a powerful tool in dynamic decision making. 
Prescriptive Use of the Model 
As was stated earlier, any model of decision making may be used to 
describe decision making or prescribe decision making. There is no 
sense in which a prescriptive use can be validated since its outputs 
have absolute status. However, if a model has high descriptive powers, 
then if used prescriptively its outputs should not seem unreasonable. 
That is, since the present model has been shown to have high descriptive 
powers, it could be used to prescribe a choice decision and the person 
using it should not feel unhappy with its choice. 
If a user does feel unhappy with the model's prescription, then it is 
. , 
reasonable to assume that his beliefs and values have been inadequately 
encapsulated. Hence, the model could be used recursively in order to 
successively refine his beliefs and values. In such cases, the purpose 
of the model would be to make explicit the decision maker's beliefs 
and values and relationships between them in complex situations. This 
suggestion is similar to the use of MAUT techniques described by Bauer 
and Wegener (1975). However, by allowing different people or groups to 
specify the "goal system" these authors also use the technique to 
highlight areas of potential conflict between people or groups. Such 
a use would also be possible with the present model. 
I 
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In addition, the model would also seem to have prescriptive 
applicability in recurring situations. For example, consider the case 
of an industrial manager who repeatedly has to choose between tenders 
for a particular type of contract. If he were to construe the tenders 
and derive weightings for his constructs, his decision could be 
prescribed. Next time he has to choose between tenders, all he has to 
do is rate them on the constructs and his decision can again be 
prescribed. 
A further application might occur if a manager has to choose between 
more tenders than he can realistically 'handle'. If he were to construe 
a representative subset of the tenders and derive weightings for his 
constructs, his decision could be prescribed once he has rated all 
tenders on all constructs. That is, the 'value system' is elicited 
on the basis of a representative subset and then applied to the total 
sample. 
The data presented for Subject 6 in Chapter 3 suggest that such an 
application would be practical. However, the selection of elements 
would be crucial since a 'biased' sample might not allow the relevant 
constructs to emerge. 
Further Applications 
Earlier in the present chapter (p. ~4) it was stated that the model 
would be used to reformulate the concepts of attention and role. 
However, before this is attempted, a task which remains untackled is 
to consider applying the model to the three studies criticised in 
Chapter 1. 
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The first concerned Mair's (1966) study of artistic preference 
behaviour. In the present terms, a repertory grid could be elicited 
using a negotiated set of paintings as elements. A set of construct 
weights could then be elicited, and preference behaviour could then 
be predicted. Furthermore, the model could also be used to explain 
why people choose different types of painting for different rooms in 
their houses, since the rooms are equivalent to situations as used in 
Chapter 3. 
The second was Reid and Holley's (1972) study of choice of university. 
This study would have been much improved by the use of personal 
constructs and MAUT techniques. For example, some prospective students 
may be more concerned with 'percentage of female students' or 
'availability of marijuana l in choosing universities than the 
dimensions offered by Reid and Holley. Furthermore, MAUT techniques 
would have enabled them to answer their questions about relative 
importances from their subjects' points of view. 
The third was Duck's work on friendship formation (Duck, 1973a, 1973b, 
1975; Duck and Spencer, 1972). By using members of a group as elements, 
and by applying MAUT techniques to weight the elicited constructs, 
similarity could be investigated in terms of both construing and 
weighting. The repertory grid has been used to investigate group 
structure (Thomas et. al., 1976), but the notion of changes in 
weighting has not yet been applied to groups and may offer a means of 
operationalising Duck's theory of friendship development. 
If these arguments are accepted, then the minimal claim which can be 
made for the present model is that it offers an improvement over 
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previous methods. However, it is also contended that the model has 
much wider applicability than previous methods. In order to illustrate' 
this claim, the seemingly disparate concepts of attention and role 
will be discussed within the framework of the model. 
A Discussion of Attention 
The 'founding fathers' of modern psychology (e.g., Wundt, Titchener, 
Helmholtz) devoted a great deal of time and experimental effort to 
elaborating the concept of attention. However, despite its auspicious 
beginnings, research on attention fell into disrepute as behaviourism 
became increasingly popular. A 'mentalistic' concept such as attention 
was unacceptable to exponents of behaviourism and such was the influence 
of the behaviourist movement that attention research ceased until the 
1950's. 
The re-emergence of attention research followed the publication of 
Broadbent's "Perception and Communication" in 1958 and since then 
articles and books on the subject have proliferated. Broadbent proposed 
a "filter" theory of attention, the filter being 'active' in the sense 
that it is seen as having the ability to select a message from a set 
of parallel messages stored in a short term memory. 
Treisman (1960, 1964) has proposed a model of attention which owes 
much to Broadbent's formulation but can be seen as making more explicit 
the selection rules governing the action of the filter. In Treisman's 
model, parallel messages are analysed for crude physical properties 
(e.g., loudness, pitch, etc.). The information resulting from this 
analysis is available to conscious perception and can be reported by 
the subject. In addition to extracting such characteristics, the 
J 
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mechanism can act to "attenuate" the signal strength of the output 
from these analysers, and it is in this way that the filter operates. 
Deutsch and Deutsch (1963) have proposed a model which is similar to 
Treisman's, not surprisingly since they draw on the same experimental 
data. However, these authors consider Treisman's model to contain 
redundant sections. Their own model incorporates the notion of 
importance; the most important stimulus captures the attention. 
Importance is largely a fupction of past experience, but transient 
changes in importance may be brought about by context, instructions . 
and so forth (Deutsch, 1960). 
Although other models of attention exist, the three mentioned are 
usually considered to be the most importantl (Moray, 1969). 
When talking about attention in an educational context, the concept 
of 'interest' is often mentioned; teachers say that they try to raise 
interest levels in order to maintain attention, and learners say that 
their attention drifts bec~use they are not interested. This suggests 
1. Much work of a physiological nature has been carried out under the 
heading of 'attention research'. Typically, attention has been 
equated with level of arousal and attributed to such structures as 
the reticular activating system (e.g., Hernandez-Peon, 1961). But 
such studies are analogous to investigating the ignition switch of 
a car in order to discover why it goes to London. It is obvious that 
a certain level of activity is required, and indeed the time-span of 
attention may be physiologically determined, but to a psychologist 
uncommitted to a reductionist approach the interesting questions are 
likely to concern the content of attention. 
--------------
. , 
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that attention may be considered in terms of the Kelly/Raiffa model. 
In these terms, the two necessary conditions for attention are a) that 
the elements of con~truction lie within the range of convenience of 
the constructs, and b) that the constructs be relatively highly 
weighted. 
Hence, the drifting of attention may be seen as fluctuations in the 
weights on constructs, thereby altering the preferences among element~~ 
and is analogous to a dynamic decision situation. Furthermore, the 
!raising of interest! described by teachers can usually be seen as 
an attempt to increase the weights on certain constructs. Everyone 
is familiar with statements of the type "Attend to this now because 
it will be useful in such-a-way later. II Such statements are aimed 
directly at influencing relative weightings. 
Although the Kelly/Raiffa model is not seen as a direct competitor to 
existing models of attention, it is possible that it could be used to 
extend such models. In particular, the model would seem to be 
compatible with the Deutsch!s model, containing as it does the notion 
of importance weightings. 
A Discussion of Role 
liThe concept (of role) has not proved to be fruitful, however, 
in psychological research. II (Miller and Swanson, 1960, p.400). 
Although this comment may surprise some psychologists, its credibility 
is strengthened by the fact that it is made by a leading authority on 
the psychology of identity. 
1 j 
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The literature on roles suggests why such a comment is possible. For 
example, Sarbin and Allen (1968) say: 
"In spite of the demonstrated utility of concepts elaborated by 
role theorists, some critics continue to point to the fact that 
. , 
certain vagaries seem to surround the central term role." (p.488). 
Similarly, Thomas and Biddle (1966) say: 
"The concept of role is the central idea in the language of 
most role analysts but, ironical~y, there is probably more 
disagreement concerning this concept than there is for any 
other in role theory." (p.29). 
The concept of role is use~ so generally that its applicability is 
severely limited; it is almost impossible to derive an operational 
definition of what a role means to the individual occupying it, and 
attempts to do so usually degenerate into vast, unstructured lists of·'-
behaviour s • 
What typifies many approaches to role theory is that a particular role 
is 'defined' independently of the person occupying it. 
" ••• conduct adheres to certain 'parts' rather than to the 
players" (Sarbin and Allen, Ope cit., p.489). 
However, the present thesis has been concerned to show that an 
individual's behaviour depends on his own beliefs and values. Since 
there is no obvious reason to believe that role behaviour is of a 
qualitatively different type to that studied, it would seem reasonable 
to formulate the concept of role in terms of the Kelly/Raiffa model. 
The data for Subject 5 presented in Chapter J suggest that such a 
formulation is feasible. That is, a person employs a set of constructs 
in relation to roles in general; any particular role which the person 
J 
1 
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adopts can be defined as a set of weightings on these constructs, each 
construct having a preferred pole; and the preferred poles and 
weightings will be different for different roles. 
For example, consider Subject 5's construct 9 "expect honesty -- not 
necessarily expect honesty". In relation to the role of 1Iwife" this 
construct has a weighting of 0.23, whereas in relation to the role of 
"student" it has a weighting of 0.049 •. Furthermore, the preferred pole 
also changes between these roles, the left-hand pole being preferred 
in the role of wife and the right-hand pole being preferred in the 
role of student. In the former role, the construct is fairly important 
and in the latter it is fairly unimportant. 
Hence it is possible to define a role in terms of the person's own 
beliefs and values. Instead of assuming that the role is delimited by 
the expectations of others, this formulation assumes that such 
delimitation can only occur if the person construes such expectations 
as relevant, if he construes them at all. 
Although developed independently, the present formulation can be 
seen to bear certain similarities to the concept of role implicit in 
. , 
the work of Fishbein and Raven (1962). Fishbein has been very much 
concerned with beliefs and values, although he prefers the term 
attitude to value. Attitudes are seen as "learned predispositions to 
respond to an object or class of objects in a favourable or unfavourable 
way" and beliefs are "hypotheses concerning the nature of these objects 
and the types of actions that should be taken with respect to them" 
(Fishbein, 1967, p.257). 
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In developing their measure of attitudes and beliefs, the AS Scales, 
Fishbein and Raven (1962) presented subjects with adjective p~irs 
taken from Osgood's semantic differential work (Osgood et. al., 1957). 
These subjects were asked to 'role-play' various kinds of people in ' 
rating the concept of ESP on the scales. Hence, Fishbein and Raven are 
implicitly defining a role as a particular combination of beliefs and 
values. However, as a research tool their AS Scales have all the same 
disadvantages discussed in relation tO,semantic differential scales 
earlier (p. 57 ) . 
In addition to offering an operational definition of roles, the present 
formulation also offers a method of defining and exploring role 
conflict. That is, role conflict can be seen as requiring two conditions 
to be met: a) the preferred pole of at least one construct ~ust lie 
at opposite ends for the two roles, and b) the construct must be 
highly weighted. 
For example, consider again Subject 5's construct 9. In relation to 
the role of wife this construct has a weighting of 0.23 and in 
relation to the role of neighbour it has a weighting of 0.185. Hence, 
the construct is fairly important in both roles. However, the 
preferred pole lies at opposite ends for these two roles. Thus, the 
formulation would suggest that conflict would be experienced if the 
person attempted to adopt both roles simultaneously and that such 
conflict would centre on the question of what Subject 5 has called 
"honesty". Although in this case the two roles may never be adopted 
simultaneously, similar conflicts are obviously anticipated, for 
example, by rules which prevent surgeons operating on close relative's. 
"----------" ---
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Such a formulation seems to offer real promise in systematically 
investigating the concepts of role and role conflict without· 
pre-judging the content of any situation, and future work should 
attempt to test the usefulness of the method in this area. 
J 
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CHilPTER 7 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
J 
-105-
Personal Construct Theory offers a useful model of an individual's 
beliefs; but as it stands it is poor at explaining or predicting 
behaviour. 
Multi-Attributed Utility Theory is a powerful model of choice 
. , 
behaviour but its usefulness depends on the initial selection of 
attributes. 
A combination of the two models has been shown to predict wholistic 
choice of films (Humphreys and Humphreys, 1975), but as used by these 
authors the model was essentially static. 
Evidence has been presented which demonstrates that weightings of 
, 
constructs change as a function of the decision maker's purpose. Areas 
investigated included choice of records, choice of books, and choice 
of clothes. 
If elements are used to elicit constructs, then it is important that 
the elements elicited are a representative cross-section. Even so, 
it is still possible that relevant constructs will not be elicited, 
but this possibility is minimised. 
Evidence has been presented which demonstrates that prediction on 
the basis of elicited dimensions is more accurate than prediction on 
the basis of supplied dimensions. 
Although evaluation of weights by hierarchical decomposition is time-
consuming, results would seem to justify the time spent since equal 
weights did not predict behaviour as accurately or as consistently. 
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It is suggested that the hierarchical method is maximally meaningful 
because it maps onto the subject's cognitive structure. 
The model was applied in t~e area of magistrates' sentencing behaviour 
and was found to predict such behaviour reasonably well. Since all 
magistrates considered the same sentences, it was possible to mak~ 
inter-subject comparisons. Such comparisons suggested that two people 
may use the same words to mean different things and, conversely, two 
people may use different words to mean the same thing. 
An analysis of all possible inter-comparisons yielded the finding 
that the most recently recruited magistrate had a view least like 
other magistrates. 
The combination of peT and MAUT is seen as being beneficial for both 
systems and the addition of the notion of purpose is seen as making 
the model less static. It also makes explicit the relative nature of 
utility. 
Given the model's high descriptive power, it should be possible to 
use the model prescriptively with a'minimum of experienced stress. It 
could also be used recursively as a means of clarifying a person's 
beliefs and values. Evidence has been presented which indicates that 
the model may also be useful in situations where the same constructs 
are used repeatedly with the same weights but with different choice 
entities. • L 
A tentative description of the model's application to the areas of 
'attention' and 'role' was presented. In particular, the model 
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suggests a simple operational definition of role conflict. In view 
of the seemingly disparate nature of the concepts of attention and 
role, it will be interesting to see what other areas of application 
suggest the~selves. 
Implications for Practice 
The results and discussions contained in the present thesis can be 
seen to have various implications with' respect to prediction or 
prescription of choice behaviour. These implications may be summarised 
as follows: 
1) In any situation, the choice of attributes is absolutely crucial. 
In order to obtain rr~ximum relevance, repertory grid techniques may 
be used to elicit personal constructs. 
2) If constructs are elicited by presenting triads of elements, then 
the selection of elements is equally crucial since a biased set of 
elements will probably produce a biased set of constructs. 
3) If a relevant set of constructs has been elicited, weighting may 
not be necessary in some situations. Unit weights may provide 
sufficient predictive or prescriptive power. 
4) If unit weights are insufficient, then brlts should be used. The 
gambles should be based on a hierarchical cluster analysis of 
constructs, if feasible. Direct rating is only feasible with a small 
number of constructs and, if used, steps should be taken to ensure 
that a sufficiently large magnitude ratio can be expressed between 
most and least important constructs. 
I 
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5) Weights will be purpose-specific. In the case of unit weights, 
the direction of weights may be purpose-specific. 
Speculations Towards a Theory of Values 
The fundamental behavioural unit from which values are inferred is 
the preference of one thing over another. To say that a person prefers 
object or outcome A to object or outcome B is to say that the person 
has a scale of value on which A is greater than B. Hence, any theory 
of values should account for preferential choice behaviour. 
• L 
To the extent that values are inferred from behaviour, then animals 
may also be seen as having values. For example, Deutsch and Jones 
(1960) t . t· hi h t II f d" t t repor an experlmen In w c ra s pre erre pure wa er 0 a 
weak salt solution. Young (1955) presents information on such 
preference patterns in many organisms under different circumstances. 
The present thesis has been concerned to demonstrate the relative 
nature of values -- relative in a between-individual sense and 
relative in the sense of variable within an individual. (For a 
general discussion of the relativity of values, see Ingarden, 1975.) 
,,"'-', 
The between-individual variation can be seen as reflecting the 
differences in belief systems or construct systems. Furthermore, 
similarity between individuals can be seen in terms of the societal 
belief system. That is, society offers (through the process of 
socialization) a framework of beliefs within which there is room for 
individual construing. Hence, a psychological theory of values should 
focus on the individual. 
The data presented in the thesis support the view that variability of 
I -1D~·-
values uithin the individual is related to the purpose or goal of 
the individual. But uha t is a goal? Consider the statement "My goal 
is to get to Glasgou". In this case, the state of being-in-Glasgou 
uould satisfy the goal, but the goal does not exist 'in vacuo'. That 
is, one uould uant to be in Glasgou for a purpose. To put it another 
uay, the state of being-in-Glasgou is preferred over other possible 
states, and this preference is relative to a goal of uhich the 
original goal ("to get to Glasgou ll ) can be seen as a sub-goal. 
If this example is generalisable, then ue may say that all goal 
statements are conceivable as value statements. Or, in hierarchical 
terms, the goal relative to uhich preferences are made is merely a 
higher-order value. Hence, repeated posing of the question "uhy?" 
causes a person to 'ladder' (Hinkle, 1965) up his value-hierarchy. 
But what is at the top? Is there an ultimate value? If there is, then 
it is likely to be that of 'survival' of the individual. . , 
It is an empirical question uhether a person's values can be adequately 
represented in hierarchical terms and, if so, the nature of the most 
superordinate values. Houever, to the extent that the notion of values 
can replace that of goal, then a theory of values should concern 
itself uith what is traditionally termed 'motivation'. That is, a 
theory of values should be concerned uith the directionality of 
behaviour (rather than motivation in the sense of 'activation' (Kelly, 
1958)). 
If the foregoing is accepted, then preference behaviour or the process 
of evaluation can be seen to be predictive, a notion uhich accords 
uell with Kelly's notion of man-the-scientist. That is, to prefer one 
I 
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object or outcome over another is to predict that it will facilitate 
the attainment of higher order preferences. 
To talk about the 'process of evaluation' is to stress the psychological 
nature of values. That is, values are not seen as residing in the 
environment or in a person but are seen as arising out of the 
individual's interaction with his environment. They are ascribed by 
I 
the person on the basis of his interac~ion with the environment. Hence, 
any theory of values should consider the process of evaluation. 
One question which has been consistently evaded is "Where do values 
come from?" and such a question is obviously relevant to a theory of 
values. Minimally, the origin of values can be seen to be 'society', 
but the argument has already been advanced that society only offers 
a framework. Hence, a theory of values should concern itself with 
the origin of an individual's values within this framework, and indeed 
should allow for values to develop which lie outside this framework. 
The sociological concept of 'deviance' can be seen as the holding of 
values which lie outside the societal fra~ework. 
In Miller, Galanter and Pribram's (1970) terms, values are a part of 
the Image or knowledge of the world. To the extent that this Image or 
system of beliefs is personally elaborated, then the values a person 
holds will also be personal. 
Scheibe (1970) has said that 
" •.. no theory of values has ever been able to explain thf? 
origin of values so as to account for their sheer number and 
variety." (p.56) 
-- -~~-- -- ---~~~-
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However, if it is accepted that to a large extent values originate 
in a person's belief system and that the belief system is personally 
elaborated and therefore unique, then the "number and variety" of 
values is not surprising. 
To summarise, a psychological theory of values should 
a) account for choice behaviour, 
b) focus on the individual, 
c) concern itself with the directionality of behaviour, 
d) suggest a structure of values, 
e) concern itself with the process of evaluation, and 
f) suggest a source of values and a process of development. 
It can be seen that the present study tackles only the first three 
requirements, and it would be a truism to say that "more work is 
needed" in the field of values. In the words of T.S. Eliot, 
"In my end is my beginning." (East Coker). 
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ELEMENTS 
1. Frank Zappa -- "Hot Rats" 
2. Jan Whi tren -- f1Raw But Tender" 
3. Rolling Stones ~- f1Get Yer Ya-Ya's Out" 
4. Vivaldi : f1Echo Concerto" --
5. Bach -- "Italian Concertofl 
6. Scarlatti -- "Sonata in D" 
7. Tom Paxton -- "Ain't That News" 
8. Charlie Parker - "Bird Symbols" 
9. Sonny Rollins -- "East Broadway Rundown fl 
10.Blind Blake -- f1Blues In Chicago" 
CONSTRUCTS 
1. Planned, leading somewhere Modular, self-contained. 
2. Controlled, tight Loose, running away. 
3. In touch Detached. 
4. Jerky Flowing. 
5. Expressive Decorative. 
6. Assaulting Gentle. 
7. Airy, cheerful Earthy, solid. 
8. Abstract About experience. 
9. Blues Avant-garde. 
10. Fluctuating mood Stable mood. 
I 
1 
! -12.2.-
PURPOSES 
1. To cheer me up. 
2. To calm me down. 
3. To drive by. 
4. To provide background whilst working. 
5. To send me to sleep. 
6. To dance ,to. 
7. To provide background over dinne~. 
8. To be stranded on a desert island with. 
ELEMENTS 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1 5 2 1 10 6 7 8 3 9 4 
2 9 7 8 1 2 4 3 6 10 5 
3 5 2 1 10 9 8 6 3 7 -4 
&3 4 5 9 10 1 2 4 6 7 3 8 t:J) 
0 
EZ 5 8 4 10 1 2 3 5 7 9 6 p 
p... 6 1 5 3 10 9 8 6 2 4 7 
7 3 7 8 1 2 4 9 6 10 5 
8 5 3 4 10 9 8 7 1 6 2 
Intuitive rank ordering of elements for each purpose. 
CONSTRUCTS 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1 R L L 1;. L L L R L R 
2 L R R R R R L L R L 
3 R L L L L L R R L L 
&3 4 R t:J) R R R R R L L R R 
0 
5 L R R R R L L R R § R 
p... 6 R L L R L L R R L R 
7 L L L R R R L L L R 
8 ! L L L L L L R R L L 
Constru.ct preferred poles for each purpose. 
r-
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CONSTRUCTS 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
.-.- - --_ . 
1 .05 .11 .15 .14 • 095 .28 .03 .01 .085 .05 
2 .004 .2 .03 .08 .04 .57 .05 .014 .002 .01 
3 .015 .146 .136 .286 .054 .205 .029 .003 .076 .05 
tJ) 
4 .01 .07 .042 .21 .03 .374 .13 .074 .05 .01 p;::j 
tJ) 
0 5 .008 .064 .029 .161 .034 .546 .119 .019 .01 .01 ~ p 6 .027 .075 .064 .238 .027 .363 .059 .029 .098 .02 p.. 
7 .013 .092 .074 .241 .197 .295 .035 .028 .015 .01 
8 .008 .126 .236 .068 .227 .059 .072 005 .054 .1 
Construct weightings for each purpose. 
• L 
1 
I I 
I 
l 
I 
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Area Considered: Reading Material. 
_ .. as .......... 
ELEMENT8 1----
~ 2 3 4J ~ 6 
-. . . 
'1 1 2. 4- 5 5 2 
2 5 2 1 2 4- 2 
';( 2 4 3 4- 3 5 
..I 
4 f 4- 3 5 3 Z 
ro 
E-f 5 2 5 3 4- 1 1 g 
~ 6 3 2 1 4- 2 1 (J) Z f.--0 
0 ? 4 2 1 1 5 3 
-
8 1 1 4 5 2 4 
9 2 4 1 Z 1 2 
~IO 3 4- 3 4 3 Z 
7 8 9 10 
4 4 2 1 
2 1 4- 3 
1 2 2 4-
5 5 1 2 
z 5 3 2 
5 5 1 1 
'I 3 4 l 
3 5 5 2 
5 5 1 2 
2 5 1 1 
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ELEMENTS 
1. ~ord Of The Rings. 
2. rhe Ragged Trousered Philanthropists. 
3. Bird Lives. 
4. The Pattern Of The Past. 
5. Narziss And Goldrnund. 
6. Journey To Ixtlan. 
7. Physical Geography. 
8. The Cortina Owner's Handbook. 
9. The Wizard Of Earthsea. 
10. The Island Of The Mighty. 
CONSTRUCTS 
1. Pessimistic Optimistic. 
2. Fact -- Fictiono 
3. Explanation -- Mystification. 
4. Unnatural forces Natural forces. 
5. Exotic Mundane. 
6. Super-awareness Dead. 
7. Real places Imaginary. 
8. Antithesis Synthesis. 
9. Sensing Measuring'. 
10. Things changing shape Solidity. 
-l1.G-
PURPOSE 
1. To cheer me IIp. 
ELEMENTS 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
11 7 4 1 6 8 9 5 10 3 2 
Intuitive rank ordering of elements for the purpose • 
. CONSTRTICTS 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
--
.- -
1 R R L R L L R R L R 
Construct preferred poles for the purpose. 
-----_._-----
CONSTRUC'fS 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
= - .. _-===_=l_= l 1 .724 .068 .01 .038 .008 .04 .017 .049 .026 .02 
Construct weightings for the purpose o 
I 
I 
l 
I 
1 
i -12.7-
1 
Area Considered: L.P. Records. 
ELEMEN'rs 
-
i 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 'to 
-
1 1 4 5 f 5 Z 3 '2 4 3 
-
2 3 4 5 1 5 1 4 3 2 1 
3 4 4 3 4 4- 3 1 5 '1 3 
4- 1 3 4 1 3 3 5 2 5 4-
tf.l -
£:-t , 1 4- Z 5 '2 1 4 4 Z 5 g 
~ 6 5 1 1 5 i 5 5 3 2 5 ro :z. 
0 
C) 7 5 4 1 3 5 1 1- 4- 5 3 
8 4 2 5 1 5 1 5 4- 2 1 
9 2 4 5 2 4 5 1 3 5 1 
10 1 3 5 4- 2 2 1 2 5 4 
r 
1 
1 
I 
! 
-l1B-
ELEMENTS 
1. Jimi Hendrix - "Are You Experienced?" 
2. Yes -- "Yessongs. Vol.l." 
3. Beethoven -- "Pastorale" 
4. E.l ton John "Don't Shoot Me, I'm Only The Piano Player." 
5. Pink Floyd "Ummagumma. Vol.l." 
. , 
6. Debussy -- "Moods" 
7. Judy Collins -- "In My Life" 
8. Rolling Stones -- "Sticky Fingers" 
9. Tchaikovsky -- "No.5" 
10. Simon And Garfunkel -- "Bridge Over Troubled Waters" 
CONSTRUCTS 
1. Rough Refined. 
2. Less meaningful Personal. 
3. Sad, despondent Lively. 
4. Extravert Introvert. 
5. Innovating Historically predictable. 
6. Well-structured, produced Basic. 
7. Making me think of outdoors Indoors, oppressive, inside myself. 
8. Transient -- Mood-producing. 
9. Words important Sound important. 
10. Of political importance, revolutionary Politically conforming, 
conservative. 
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PURPOSES 
1. As general background. 
2. As a background to study • 
.3.. To 'doze' by. 
- --
ELEMENTS 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
U) 1 5 4 7 2 6 1 10 3 8 9 I":il 
U) 2 6 4 8 5 9 , 10 3 2 7 0 .J... § 3 4 2 5 8 7 1 6 3 9 10 p..., 
IntUltlve rank orderlng of elements for each purpose. 
CONSTRUCTS 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
-
-,---"._ .. _ .. _--
U) 1 L L R L R R L L R R I":il 
':1) 
2 L L R L L R R L R R 0 § 
.3. L R R L L_ L L R R L p..., 
ConstI~ct preferred poles for each purpose. 
CONSTRUCTS 
-- _ .. _---._-----
-------------
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
- - -
If.l 1 .049 .327 .104 .073 .002 .023 .OLI4 .1LI_ .207 .031 I":il g 2 .032 .288 .06 .032 .00;2 .007 .139 .432 .001 .007 § ,., 
.107 .03 .182 .16 .12 .049 .098 .03 .194 .03 p..., .:; 
Construct weightings for each purpose. 
• L 
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Area Considered: Clothes. 
.-
--
ELEMENTS 
-
i 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
- - ~ - - .. 
1 1 2. 5 2 4 1 5 Z 3 3 
2 4 4- 3 5 '2 1 3 2 3 5 
3 2 4- 5 1 3 2 5 3 1 2 
4 2 4 1 4- 3 5 1 5 3 5 
00 
8 5 3 -J 5 4 2. 1 3 2 2 5 g 
Cl:i . 
1:-1 6 3 3 '2 1 1 4 5 3 2 5 Cf.l z 
0 . 
(.) 7 1 2 4 1 3 5 4- 4- 2 4 
----
8 1 f 2 5 '2 3 3 1 4- 4-
9 3 4- Z 1 4- 4 3 Z 1 4-
10 3 4 1 5 2 5 1 2 3 5 
J 
I 
I 
1 
-131'-
ELEMENTS 
1. Long Skirt. 
2. Trousers (decent). 
. , 
3. Jeans. 
4. Long Hostess Dress. 
5. Simple Cotton Dress. 
6. Two-Piece Suit. 
7. Thick Pullover. 
8. Short Skirt (plain). 
9. Blouse. 
10. Midi-Length Black Dress. 
CONSTRUCTS 
1. Restrained, 'prim and proper' -- Easy. 
2. Feeling 'cold', 'straight' Feeling seductive. 
3. Feminine 'Butch'. 
4. Casual Formal. 
5. Inspiring confidence -- Makes me feel awkward. 
6. Bright and gay -- Sombre. 
7. Slimming -- , Stumpifying' • 
8. Simple Complex. 
9. Comfortable -- Uncomfortable. 
10. Country -- Town. 
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PURPOSES 
l. To relax in at home. 
2. To go to work in. 
3. To go to a party in. 
4. To go on a picnic in. 
ELEMENTS 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
""- . 
.. 
l' 2 6 4 2 8 9 5 7 2 10 
Cf.l 
r£l 2 6 1 9 10 3 5 8 4 2 7 Cf.l 
0 
~ 3 3 5 7 1 6 10 8 9 2 4 p... 4 2 8 1 9 5 7 3 4 6 10 
Intuitive rank ordering of elements for each purpose • 
. 
CONSTRUCTS 
1 2 3 !+ 5 6 7 8 9 10 
.-...• -
1 R R L L R L L T L L .I.J 
Cf.l 
r£l 2 L L L R L L L L R R tt) 
0 
Ii1 3 R R L R L L L R L R ~ p... 
4 R R L L L L L L L L 
-'-_ .. - --_._-_ ....... 
Construct preferred poles for each purpose. 
CONS'lIRUCTS 
l 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 '110 
.-
.-... -
-
_ ... ._-
1 .026 .008 .009 .1l2 .001 .029 .107 .003 .69 .015 
Cf.l 
r£l 2 .006 .009 .03 .032 .429 .014 .451 .018 .009 .002 Cf.l 
0 § 3 .006 .113 .188 .001 .002 .065 .041 .002 .581 .001 
p... 4 .12 .034 .18 .16 .022 .036 .12 .024 .144 .16 
... - - .-.--- -~--
-
Construct weightings for each puryJose. 
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Area Considered: Roles. 
ELEMENTS 
i 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1) 
.. ,.. .~ F~· -= 
1 2 4 2. 5 3 3 1 5 2 
2 4 1 4 3 5 3 4 2 5 
3 4 5 2. 5 1 4 1 3 '2 
4 5 4 2 3 1 3 2. 3 1 
m 
E-l 5 3 1 5 1 4- 3 5 1 5 g 
tri 
8 6 2. 1 4 3 4 1 5 1 Z §g 
0 --' 
(,) 7 1 4 5 2 3 3 4- 2 4 
8 2 5 1 4- 2 3 1 4 Z 
9 1 Z 4 2. 3 4 4 1 5 
10 3 5 4 2 1 1 4 3 2 
r" 
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ELEMENTS 
1. A Doctor (G.P.) 
2. A Vicar. 
3. A Bus Conductor. 
4. A School Teacher. 
5. A Secretary. 
6. A Nurse. 
7. A Hairdresser. 
8. A Therapist. 
9. A Shop Assistant. 
CONSTRUCTS 
1. Concerned with physical things 
2. Not in touch with 'real world' 
3. Financial gain from relationship 
4. Serving -- Controlling. 
5. Concerned with personal growth 
Concerned with mental things. 
In touch with 'real world'. 
No financial gain. 
Not concerned with personal 
growth. 
6. Caring -- Not involved in caring. 
7. Expected to be knowledgeable Not expected to know anything. 
8. Expect concrete results Don't eXpect concrete results. 
9. Expect honesty Not necessarily expect honesty. 
10. Probably ambitious No~ necessarily ambitious. 
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PURPOSES 
1- Wife. 
2. Daughter. 
3. Student. 
4. Neighbour. 
5. Consumer. 
6. Social Worker. 
7. Close Friend (same sex). 
ELEMENTS 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1 3 2 9 5 6 4 7 1 8 
2 5 2 9 4 8 3 7 1 6 
CI) 3 3 4 9 2 6 5 8 1 7 
. , 
r:<:l 
6 CI) 4 8 4 5 7 3 2 9 1 0 
~ 5 1 9 3 8 4 5 2 7 6 ;::::J 
p... 
6 1 4 8 5 6 2 9 3 7 
7 5 1 9 3 6 4 8 2 7 
Intuitive rank ordering of elements for each purpose. 
CONSTRUCTS 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
---
1 R R R L L L L L L R 
2 R R R L R L L R L R 
CI) 3 R 
r:<:l 
L R L L R L L R L 
CI) 
4 L R R L R L R R R R 0 ~ 5 L R L R R R L L R R p... 
6 R R R L R L L L L L 
'7 'R L R L L L R R L R 
.. -.~ 
_ .• _00· ,. _. __ • __ 
Construct preferred poles for each purpose. 
-13~ 
CONSTRUCTS 
.. - ---+' 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
---
I .0/+ .04 .OLI- .06 .08 .365 .06 .035 .23 .05 
2 .076 .05 .103 .239 .016 .251 .028 .025 .162 .05 
~ 3 .06 .073 .065 .016 .088 .081 ~41+6 .022 .049 .1 
CI) 4 .084 .09 .091 .075 .081 .2 .1 .044 .185 .05 0 ~ 5 .068 .194 .049 .146 .025 .068 .195 .101 .08/+ .07 
P-. 
6 .023 .1 ~191 .034 .019 .167 .139 .109 .208 .01 
7 .101 .028 ~12 .08 .09 .l86 .085 .06 .2 .05 
-
Construct weightings for ~ach pUrpose. 
---'--'--' .~---~ 
1 
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! 
Area Considered: Reading Material. 
. , 
ELEMENTS (Set 1) 
i 2 3 4 5 6, 7 8 9 1) 
= ~'-
1 1 2 4- Z 4- 5 5 5 S 4 
2 5 5 5 5 1 1 5 5 4- 5 
3 5 5 4 5 4 5 4 3 4- 5 
4 1 3 3 3 2. 1 1 1 3 5 
~ 
E-t , 3 '2 3 4- 1 1 5 5 3 2 g 
~ 6 Z 1 1 3 5 5 5 5 1 4-co z 
0 
(.) ? 5 4- 4- 3 2 4 2 2 4- 'Z 
8 4 Z 1 Z 1 1 1 1 f 1 
9 3 Z 1 1 3 3 1 1 2 l 
~/o 
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Area Considered: Reading Material. 
ELEMEN'rs (Set 2) 
i 2 : -:ff~ 6 7 a 9 10 - ~ -. --1 1 4- 4- 5 3 4 3 
2 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 3 5 
3 5 4 4 4 2 1 4- 5 5 5 
4 '1 3 1 1 1 f 1 4 5 4 
ro 
E-t , 3 3 3 5 5 4- 5 3 1 3 g 
~ 6 Z 1 2 3 5 5 5 4- '2 5 t:f.i ~ 
0 . 
0 7 5 4- 4 4 4- 3 2 5 4 t 
""-
8 5 1 3 4 1 3 1 3 1 2.. 
~-
9 3 1 4- 2 1 3 1 2 2 1 
'., 
10 
.. ~-. 
. . 
-13~-
ELEMENTS (Set 1) 
--
1. Organizational Behavior And Human Performance. 
2. Scientific American. 
3. Far East Eco~omic Review. 
4. McKeac:tUe And Doyle. 
5. Larousse. 
6. The Malayan Cook Book~ 
7. The Road To Wigan Pier. 
8. Fiesta. 
9. Sunday Times / Observer. 
10. History Of The Pin-Up. 
ELEMENTS (Set 2) 
1. Psychological Review. 
2. Guardian. 
3. 0.S.8 Handbook. 
4. Human Associative Memory. 
5. Brave New World. 
6. As You Like It. 
7. The Cripple Tree. 
8~ A.A. Book Of The Road. 
9. Habitat Catalogue. 
10. The Day Before Yesterday. 
r-~---- ------- --
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CONSTRUCTS 
1. Academic -- Non-academic. 
2. Food -- Non-food. 
3. Fiction Non-fiction. 
4. No pictures -- Lots of pictures. 
5. Segmented -- Not segmented. 
6. Current affairs -- Not current affairs. 
7. Historical -- Not historical.. 
8. Light reading -- Heavy reading. 
9. Clear -- Unclear. 
PURPOSES 
l. To keep up to date. 
2. To read on the 'Tube' •. 
3. To read on a plane. 
4. To while away time at home. 
5. To obtain specific information. 
ELEMENTS (Set 1) 
-
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
.. 
-
1 2 1 3 5 10 9 8 7 4 6 
U) 2 9 4 1 10 5 6 7 8 2 3 
~ 
U) 3 8 5 1 9 7 6 3 4 2 10 0 § 4 8 5 2 7 4 3 9 10 1 6 
(:l; 
5 5 1 4 3 6 7 9 10 8 2 
Intuitive ranking of elements for each purpose. 
~ j 
1 
; 
i 
! 
--! 
CI) 
f:iI 
CI) 
0 § 
p.... 
CI) 
f:iI 
CI) 
0 
~ p.... 
CI) 
f:iI 
CI) 
0 
~ p.... 
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ELEMENTS (Set 2) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1 2 1 5 4 9 10 7 8 3 6 
2 9 1 7 10 5 8 4 6 2 3 
3 7 3 6 9 2 10 1 8 5 4 
.4 8 1 7 10 5 9 6 3 2 4 
5 5 6 4 3 9 8 10 2 1 7 
Intuitive rank ordering of elements for each purpose o 
~_·W 
CONSTRUCTS 
-
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1 L R R L L L R L L 
2 R R R R L L R L L 
3 R R R L L L R L L 
4 R R R L L L R L L 
5 L R R R L L R L L 
Construct preferred poles for each purpose. 
---
CONSTRUCTS 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
- .-
--
I .12 .061 .24 .015 .013 .12 .06 • ill .26 
2 .081 .03 0052 .021 .015 .054 .021 .581 .145 
3 .084 .05 .062 .12 .06 .056 .12 .291 .157 
4, .013 .035 .043 .09 .225 .013 .135 .357 .089 
5 .008 .009 .932 .013 .011 0012 .006 .002 .007 
Construct weightings for each purpose. 
-14.:l-
S~T Nco 7 
Area Considered: Reading Material. 
ELEI1ENTS 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 a 9 I 10 
-. 
. ~~ . ~..,., ..... ~-' 
1 1 1 5 3 3 4 4 5 1 
2 4- 3 3 1 1 5 3 3 4 
3 1 f 3 1 1 4 1 5 1 
4 1 3 5 1 2 4 5 5 1 
(ll 
8 5 5 4 1 1 1 ' '2 1 1 5 g 
~ 6 5 4 1 5 5 3 1 5 5 ~ 
0 
0 7 , 1 3 5 4 4 5 5 5 1 
8 3 1 1 4- 5 3 1 1 4 
9 
10 ' 
~ 
-j 
I 
! 
-14-3-
ELEMENTS 
l. Sartre Trilogy. 
2. Puckoon. 
3. Lasky's Catalogue. 
4. Bird Lives. 
5. Lennon Remembers. 
6. Psychology Today. 
7. Guardian. 
8. Book Of British Birds. 
9. Steppenwolf. 
CONSTRUCTS 
1. Story, novel, narrative Information. 
2. Music -- Psychology. 
3. Black and white Colour. 
4. Historical Contemporary. 
5. Can be opened anywhere -- Beginning-to-end job. 
6. Transient Lasting. 
7. Many levels of meaning Straightforward. 
8. Mostly 'distant' Can identify with. 
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PURPOSES 
1. To read on the 'Tube'. 
2. To read for 'escape' • 
3. To cheer me up. 
4. To give as a present. 
5. To keep up to date. 
ELEMENTS 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1 8 7 2 6 5 3 1 4 9 
f£l 2 2 4 9 3 5 8 7 6 1 (/) 
0 3 8 4 3 6 7 5 1 2 9 ~ 4 1 5 9 4 6 7 8 2 3 P-. 
5 8 7 2 6 5 3 1 4 9 
~~- .---~ _ .. - , --.--,"-'-' 
Intuitive rank ordering of elements for each purpose. 
CONSTRUCTS 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1 R R R R L L R L 
f£l (/) 2 L R L L R R L R 
0 § 3 L L R L L L R L 
P-. 4 L L R L R R L L 
5 R R R R L L R L 
Construct preferred poles for each purpose. 
CONSTRUCTS 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1 .205 .045 .005 .137 .428 .047 .086 .047 
f£l 2 .173 .14 006 .019 .08 .04 .128 .36 (/) 
0 3 .23 .05 .05 .06 .14 .07 .29 .ll § 
4 .05 .08 .12 .05 .07 .45 .07 .11 P-. 
5 •• 328 .05 .05 .328 .081 .045 .073 .045 
Con.struct '.leightings for each purpose. 
• L 
I 
. , 
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t 
Area Considel'ed: L.P. Records. 
-~ 
ELgMENTS 
i 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1) 
. ~ ~ -- - . -.~ 
1 3 2 3 3 3 3 2 3 3 2 
t:I) 2 Z 2 i 3 
M 
3 l 4 2 2 2 
:;j 
3 1 1 1 1 1 1 '2 i l 1 0 
t:I) 
:;j 4 '2 1 Z 2 2 2 2 1 4- 1 
H 
E-l , Z 3 1 3 3 3 3 3 3 z 3 ~'i1 
~ 6 1 3 1 5 ~ 3 2 3 3 1 3 
H 
~ ? 1 1 1 3 3 '2 3 t 1 1 0 
H 
E-l 8 1 1 3 1 1 1 3 1 4- 3 z ~ 
M 9 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 t:I) 
, 
10 
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SEIViANTI C DI:F'FERRT'iJ'I'IAL SCALES 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1 R 1 1 R R 1 1 L 1 
2 L R 1 L L R R L "L 
3 R L L R L L L L L 
'=/) 4 L R L R L R R L L r:il 
tI) 
0 5 L R L R R R R L L ~ p... 6 R L L R L L L L L 
7 L R L R L R R L L 
8 L L L L L L L L L 
Scale preferred poles for each purpose. 
--
SEMANTIC DIFFERENTIAL SCALES 
1 2 3 I 5 6 7 8 9 l+ 
1 .03 .067 .36 .02 .032 .284 .067 .09 .05 
2 .074 .099 .147 .031 .025 .469 .025 .098 .032 
I 
3 .035 .13 .14 .035 .16 .241 .086 .14 .033 
tI) 
i:£I 4 .025 .15 .06 .025 .1 .399 .06/{- .14 .037 tI) 
0 § 5 .02 .16 .072 .02 .017 .325 .068 .288 .03 
p... 6 .015 .213 .081 .015 .08 0319 .053 .189 .035 
7 ' .02 .12 .144 .02 .04 .359 .051 .216 .03 
8 
.! .063 .123 .172 .042 .148 .222 .123 .074 .033 
Scale i-Jeightings for each purpose. 
" , 
,""""' 
'-- ~. 
-14-7-
Area Cons1deredt Reading Material. 
ELE11ENTS 
-
i 2 3 4 5 6 7 a 9 10 
- --
.. = 
. ~ . ~ 
1 1 5 3 1 2 1 2 1 1 
(I) 2 1 3 5 1 1 3 3 2- 1 
r:il 
~ 3 1 1 3 1 1 3 3 1 1 u (I) 
H 4 1 2 5 1 1 3 4- 3 1 ~ 
H 
E-t , :z; 3 1 5 2. 2 4- 4- 3 3 r:rl 
~ 2 ~ 6 :3 4- 1 1 4- 3 5 Z 
H 
A 
3 2. 1 u ? Z 3 Z 3 t 3 
f·-j 
E-t 
4- 3 5 3 ~ 8 , 5 3 3 2 3 pq 
(I) 9 3 3 4 3 3 3 3 2. 3 
10 
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SEHANTIC DIFFERENTIAL SCALES 
1 2 .3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1 R L L R L L L L L 
~ 2 L L L L L L L L L 
tI) 
.3 R R L R L L L L L 0 § 4 L L L L L L L L L 
P.. 
5 L L L L L L L L L 
Scale preferred poles for each purpose. 
SEMANTIC DIFFERENTIAL SCALES 
1 2 .3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1 .05 .0.34 ,.616 .0.34 .1.37 .076 .019 .01 .024 
tI) 2 .05 .072 .479 .048 .179 .067 .029 .0.38 .038 
r£1 
tI) 3 .05 .09 .4l9 .09 .091 .067 .057 .068 .068 0 § 4 .05 .0/1-6 ,.693 .031 .015 .086 .019 .02/1- .036 
P.. 
5 .2 .014 .028 .014 .065 .024 .072 .058 .525 
Scale weightings for each purpose. 
APPENDIX B 
BruneI University, 
Kingston Lane, 
UXBRIDGE, 
Middlesex. 
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II A NOTE ON THE WEIGHTING OF CONSTRUCTS" 
TECHNICAL REPORT No. 43 
November, 1974. 
c. McKNIGHT. 
FOR If'IE $lUCY OF 
",," H'·'" '- ' .. ".,(:" 
~L 
'-!. 
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INTRODUCTION. 
------------
------------
In recent ye~rs, decision theorists have become increasingly 
aware that real-life decisions are seldom composed of only 
one dimension of variability. In response to this awareness, 
a class of models has been developed which are capable of 
handling multi-dimensional situations. These models have come 
to be known as "multi-attributed utility" models. Although 
the mathematical basis for these models is fairly well 
established, the problem of where t~ get relevant ~ttributes 
or dimensions has been largely avoided. As Fischer (1972) puts 
it .•.• 
It ••• it should be noted that this research completely 
ignored the problem of defining the list of value 
attributes relevant to a given decision. These were 
simply given to subjects as part of their tasks ••• 
This criticism applies not only to the present research, 
but also to virtually all psychological studies of 
preferences for multi-attributed alternatives. It (p.84-5) 
One notable exception to this criticism was Humphreys and 
Humphreys' (1973) use of the Kelly Repertory Grid technique 
as a basis for providing relevant dimensions. Since a review 
of the Humphreys' work in relation to repertory grids is being 
undertaken elsewhere (McKnight, 1975a), we need not consider 
the details of their research here. Suffice to say that it 
provided a useful lead in attempting to make decision theory 
more applicable to real-life situations. Following this lead, 
recent research by the present author has been directed towards 
the use of Raiffa's (1969) model of multi-attributed utility 
as a basis for weighting and combining constructs in a variety 
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of decision-making situations. 
To elaborate, although a person may use the same constructs 
in different situations, the relative importance of these 
constructs may change depending upon the situation. Although 
the terms in which a person construes, say, books may stay the 
same to a large extent, the weightings applied to the 
constructs may vary as a function of the situation in which 
the person wants to read a particular book. 
To illustrate the point being made, consider the construct 
Itclarifying -- mystifying" in relation to bo:)ks. If one is 
choosing a textbook from which to work for an exam, such a 
construct may be very important (ie., heavily weighted). However, 
if one is choosing a novel to read on a long journey, such a 
construct may not contribute much to the choice of book --
although it is still a construct which one brings to bear on 
reading material. This is somewhat over~simplified, but the 
implications of weighted constructs are more fully-discussed 
elsewhere (McKnight, 1975b). 
Although the Raiffa technique provides quite good results, it 
is not without its own attendant difficulties. In particular, 
the consideration of reference gambles is a long, tedious task 
which subjects do not enjoy, the more so since they are required 
to consider so many gambles over the course of the experiment1• 
1. For a detailed account of the use of the Raiffa technique 
in conjunction with a repertory grid, and some of the 
methodological problems therein, see McKnight (1974). 
r 
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The most obvious way to simplify the technique would be to 
let subjects 'intuitively' assign importance weightings to 
the constructs. That is, merely ask subjects how important 
they felt each construct was in a particular situation. However, 
Chapman (1974) found that results obtained using subjects' 
intuitive weightings of constructs were grossly inferior to 
those obtained by the Raiffa method. 
In view of these considerations, it· was decided to investigate 
alternative methods of weighting constructs. Since the Raiffa 
results are quite good in that they predict behaviour reasonably 
well, it was decided to apply various weighting schemes to 
existing data. In this way, the 'predictive power' of each 
new scheme could be compared with the existing Raiffa results 
for the same data. 
The present paper describes several methods of weighting 
constructs and compares each method to the corresponding 
Raiffa results (Part 1). It then describes a method of optimising 
the Raiffa weightings and reflects on the problems encountered 
(Part 2). In all cases, the data used are real data obtained 
from one subject over eight situations. That is, eight sets 
of Raiffa weights have been elicited from the subject, each 
set being in relation to a particular decision situation. 
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Pft~T 1 : IN SillLBCH OF A METHOD. 
==~=========================== 
The first line of approach was to consider what would happen 
if constructs were assumed to be equally weighted. This is 
equivalent to assuming that constructs are completely 
unweighted. Hence we may merely arrange the grid into the 
'preferred pole' form (McKnight, 1974), sum ratings across 
constructs, and rank order the sums. This procedure was applied 
to S1 's eight situations and the resulting rank orders were 
correlated with S1 's actual choice in each situation. We may 
compare these correlations with those obtained between the 
Raiffa predictions and S1 's choices as follows:-
SITUATIONS 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
RAIFFA .903 .820 .855 .976 .733 .915 .951 .964 
UI'JWEIGHTED .905 .664 .864 .852 .509 .952 .442 .542 
DIFFERENCE 
-.002 +.156 -.009 +.124 +.224 -.037 +.509 +.422 
This comparison produced the surprising result that in three 
of the eight situations, better predictability was obtained by 
not weighting the constructs. Although this result is surprising, 
it is hardly a basis for not weighting constructs. This is 
particularly evident if we look at the range of results for 
each 'treatment'. The Raiffa results have a range of .976-.733 
=0.243 while the unweighted results have a range of .952-.442 
=0.510. Also, the negative differences are quite small while 
the positive differences are much larger. Hence, although 
unweighted results are marginally better than the Raiffa results 
in three out of eight cases (situations 1, 3 and 6), the Raiffa 
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results are more consistent. 
The next line of approach was to consider what would happen 
if we introduced a very basic form of weighting. The most 
basic weighti~g scheme is .simply to use rank orders as 
weightings, ie., given 10 constructs, the most important 
construct is weighted by a factor of 10 and the least important 
is weighted by a factor of 1. Since this work was carried out 
retrospectively, it was not possible to ask the subject to 
rank order the constructs for each situation. Hence, for the 
purpose of comparison, the constructs were ranked in terms of 
the Raiffa weights. The correlations between 'rank-weighted' 
predictions and actual choices may then be compared with those 
obtained using unweighted predictions, as follows:-
SITUATIONS 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
UNWEIGHTED 
.905 .664 .864 .852 .509 .952 .442 .542 
RAATK- WEIGHTED .864 .770 .939 .952 .612 .939 .506 .639 
RATFFA 
.903 .820 .855 .976 .733 .915 .951 .964 
It can be seen that in six of the eight cases, better 
predictability is obtained by the introduction of a very basic 
weighting scheme. Also, the predictability is slightly more 
consistent, as evidenced by the range of .952-.506=0.446. 
However, this scheme only produces results better than the 
Raiffa method in two of the eight cases (situations 3 and 6) 
and is less consistent. In principle, it would be possible to 
compare all possible rank-orders with the subject's chosen 
rank-order and select the one which gave the best predictability. 
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However, for 10 constructs there are 10! = 3628800. possible 
rank-orders, and since there are at least eight situations 
per subject, we would have to calculate at least 29030400 
correlations per subject. Even in these days of 'computer 
power' the task would be formidable, and furthermore, such a 
random search could hardly be considered methodologically 
justifiable. 
Leaving aside the issue of how to rank-order constructs for 
the moment, the next stage was to make the distribution of 
weightings a little more sophisticated. The use of the rating 
scale suggested the work of Helson (1964) on Adaptation-level 
Theory. In studying subjective ratings, Helson made use of a 
geometric series of the form .•• 
1 x 
x 
Hence it was decided to make the weightings form such a serL:;s. 
This method had a certain intuitive appeal since it smacked of 
psychophysics, 'hard' psychology, and the stuff that 'laws' 
are made of (Helson' s original work was based on a reformulation 
of the Fechner Law). However, as soon as one tries to apply 
the method, the problem arises "how big should x be?" 
Picking one of the decision situations at random, x was set to 
0.9 and the correlation between predicted and actual ordering 
was calculated to be 0.576. By reducing x to 0.8, the 
correlation was increased to 0.648, and by further reducing 
x to 0.6 the correlation was increased to 0.842. 
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Obviously, one can continue this approach ad nauseam, or at 
least until one begins to 'hunt' around a maximum correlation. 
However, conceptually at least, such a method is only marginally 
better than the 'random' search for an optimal rank-ordering. 
""ith this in mind, it was .decided to plot the 'pattern' of 
weightings for each situation in an attempt to provide a 
guide for the search. 
Having plotted the patterns, there appeared to be some degree 
of similarity between six of the situations while the remaining 
two were similar to each other but slightly different from the 
majority. The six are presented as Figure 1 and the two are 
presented as Figure 2. 
Visual inspection of the two sets of plottings suggested an 
exponential decay curve. For this reason, a curve-fitting 
program (Telfit, 1969) was used to fit such a curve to each 
set of data. The resulting curves together with their equations 
are shown superimposed on the original data in Figures 3 and 4. 
These curves were used to provide weightings which were then 
used to predict the subject's rank-ordering. The resulting 
correlations thus obtained can be compared with the Raiffa 
results as follows:-
SITUATIONS 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
RAIFFA 
.903 .820 .855 .976 .733 .915 .951 .964 
EXPONENTIAL .912 .600 .830 .939 .733 .794 .736 .782 
DIFFERENCE -.009 +.220 +.025 +.037 0 +.121 +.215 +.182 
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It can be seen that the exponential results are better than 
the Raiffa results in only one case (situation 1) and that 
they are as good as the Raiffa results in one further case 
(situation 5). In the case of situations 7 and 8 this is hardly 
surprising since the one thing which distinguishes these two 
situations is lacking in the corresponding exponential curve, 
ie., the extreme 'dominance' of one construct. So dominant is 
the one construct in these two cases that ranking in terms of 
just this construct produces better'results than the exponential 
curve, as follows:-
SITUATION 
7 8 
RAIFFA 
.951 .964 
EXPONENT I.A..L .736 .782 
HAJOR CONSTRUCT .942 .918 
This is a particularly anomalous result if we remember that 
the present discussion stqrted from the assumption that decision 
situations are multi-dimensional. However, the Raiffa method 
does give better results than the major con~truct results; the 
point to be made is that some situations are more multi-
dimensional than others. 
The inadequacy of the exponential results is further stressed 
by the other six situations. If we plot the median pattern 
of the six sets of weightings in Figure 1 and use this to 
derive a set of weightings, the results thus obtained are 
better than those obtained using the exponential curve, as 
the following table indicates:-
• L 
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SITUATIONS 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
RAIFFA 
.903 .820 .855 .976 .733 .915 
HEDIAN 
.939 .770 .830 .976 .661 .915 
EXPONENTIAL 0912 .600 .830 .939 .733 .794 
In only one case does the exponential result surpass the 
median result (situation 5). Hence, exponential curve-fitting 
would not seem to be the answer in the present case. However, 
it is interesting that the pattern of weightings was similar 
in each situation. This in itself may merit future investigation 
since a particular decision 'style' may be reflected in a 
characteristic pattern of:weightings. That is, some people 
may be characteristically more multi-dimensional than others 
in their decision-making. Again, this point will be more 
fully dealt with elsewhere (McKnight, 1975b). 
PART 2 : IN SEARCH OF PERFECTION. 
---------------------------------------------------------~------
The final stage of the curve-fitting phase waS to fit a curve 
through the median curve described earlier. The best fit 
available was found to be given by the seventh-order polynomial 
expression:-
y = .291 - .040988x - .035873x2 
.000163x7 
At this stage it was felt that the original data -- the 
behaviour of a subject was being 'left behind'. For this 
reason, it was decided to approach the problem from a different 
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angle by saying "Given the subject's choice behaviour, what 
should the weightings be in order to match this behaviour 
perfectly?" To do this using only the choice behaviour and 
the grid would be an enormous task since, as we saw earlier, 
there are over three million possible rank-orderings of 
constructs. Also, in true ,Bayesian spirit, it would be sub-
optimal not to use available information (ie., the Raiffa 
weightings) as a basis for revision of opinion. Hence, the 
method chosen was to adjust the Raiffa weightings in such a 
way that the predicted orderin~ more closely resembled the 
subject's real ordering. 
Taking situation 8 as an example, consider the relationship " 
between real and predicted orders:-
ELEMENT No. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
REAL RA1lJ< 8 4 10 1 2 3 5 7 9 6 
PREDICTED RANK 8 6 10 1 2 3 4 7 9 5 
DIFFERENCE ( d) 0 2 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
d2 0 4 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
Since our measure of correlation (Spearman Rho) varies as an 
inverse function of Z d2 ,we must try to reduce the value of ,--
this term. Given this strategy, a reasonable tactic would be 
to consider first the element which contributed the largest 
amount to ~ d2 and attempt to reduce this amount. Hence, in 
the present example, we should try to reduce the amount of d2 
contributed by element 2 since this is the largest single 
amount. That is, we must 'improve' (where 1=best and 10=worst) 
the predicted ranking of this element. In order to do thiS, 
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we must find a construct on which this element is rated highly. 
Consider the preferred pole grid for this situation:-
ELEMENTS (L.P. RECORDS) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1 4 1 1 5 5 3 1 3 2 1 , 
2 2 1 2 1 1 1 1 3 5 1 
3 2 2 2 5 5 5 4 1 1 2 
CI) 
E-l 
4 3 1 1 5 4 2 1 3 3 2 
g 5 3 1 2 4 5 5 2 1 1 2 p:: 
E-l 
UJ 
6 2 3 2 5 4 4 4 2 1 3 
:z; 7 2 3 1 5 4 3 3 3 2 2 0 
0 8 5 4 5 5 5 5 5 2 2 1 
9 3 2 2 3 3 4 3 1 5 1 
10 3 4 3 2 2 5 2 2 3 2 
Scanning down the column which represents element 2, we see 
that this element is rated highest on construct 10. Furthermore, 
only one other element (No.6) has a higher rating on this 
construct. Hence, we increase the weighting on construct 10. 
At this stage, the amount of increase was fairly arbitrary 
since no guidelines existed. Originally the weighting on this 
construct was 0.01, and by increasing this to 0.03 we get the 
following result:-
ELEMENT No. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
REAL RANK 8 4 10 1 2 3 5 7 9 6 
PREDICTED RANK 8 5 10 1 2 3 4 7 9 6 
DIFFERENCE ( d) 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
d 2 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
In this case, ~d2 = 2.0 and the corresponding correlation 
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Rs = 0.988. Using the same method, the correlation for 
situation 7 was increased to 0.964. Flushed with this apparent 
victory, it was decided to attack the worst correlation, 
situation 5, in which the situation w~s as follows:-
ELEMENT No •. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
REAL RANK 1 5 3 10 9 8 6 2 4 7 
PREDICTED RANK 3 6 5 8 7 10 9 1 2 4 
DIFFERENCE ( d) 2 1 2 2 2 2 3 1 2 3 
d2 4 1 4 4 4 4 9 1 4 9 
In this example, d2 is much more evenly distributed, but 
elements 7 and 10 do have more than other elements. Hence, 
it was decided to attempt to reduce d2 for element 7. For 
situation 5 the preferred pole grid was as follows:-
ELEMENTS (L.P. RECORDS) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1 2 5 5 1 1 3 5 3 4 5 
2 4 5 4 5 5 5 5 3 1 5 
3 4 4 4 1 1 1 2 5 5 4 
ill 4 3 1 1 5 4 2 1 3 3 2 E-l 
0 5 3 5 4 2 1 1 4 5 5 4 p 
IX: 6 4 4 4 5 E-l 3 1 2 2 2 3 ill 
:z; 7 4 3 5 1 2 3 3 3 4 4 0 
0 8 4 4 5 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 
9 3 4 4 3 3 2 3 5 1 5 
10 3 4 3 2 2 5 2 2 3 2 
Scanning down element 7 we see that it is rated highly on 
constructs 1 and 2. However, in both these constructs several 
other elements are rated as high and hence reweighting the 
construct would have too many ramifications. This would also 
seem to be true for constructs 5 and 8, on which element 7 is 
1 
I 
rated fairly highly. The way round this problem is to consider 
the mean rating on each construct and measure the deviation 
from this mean for element 7, as shown in the following table:-
CONSTRUCT No. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
A VR"R.AG E RAT ING eX) 3.4 4.2 3.1 2.5 3.4 3.0 3.2 2.1 3.3 
ELEMENT 7 - X +1.6 +0.8 -1.1 -1.5 +0.6 -1.0 -0.2 +1.9 -0.3 
Since we want to improve the predicted ranking of element 7, 
we increase the weighting on that construct which has the 
maximum positive deviation, ie., construct 8. This yields the 
following results:-
ELEMENT No. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
REAL RANK 4 6 5 9 7 10 8 1 3 2 
PREDICTED RANK 1 5 3 10 9 8 6 2 4 7 
DIFFERENCE e d) 3 1 2 1 2 2 2 1 1 5 
d2 9 1 4 1 4 4 4 1 1 25 
Thus we have reduced d2 for element 7 but ~ncreased d2 for 
element 10. In fact, if we look at the real and predicted 
rankings for these two elements we find that the differences 
between real and predicted are in opposite directions, a point 
which is lost by considering d2• Hence, every time we reduce 
d2 for element 7 we will increase d2 for element 10, and vice 
versa. 
This is an important point since it indicates another reason 
why the correlation may not be 1.0 in any particular situation. 
That is, even if the Raiffa technique produces 'perfect' 
10 
2.8 
-0.8 
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weightings, the subject's choice may not be based on th~ 
relationships embodied in ,the grid. This situation may arise 
in two ways:- a) the subject may be making his decision on the 
basis of constructs which do not appear in the grid, and b) the 
subject may have reconstrued (in the sense of re-rated) various 
elements. 
An example of, the former situation arose with 84 who had chosen 
to consider decisions in relation to clothes. The particular 
situation involved the choice of clothes to wear to a party. 
The major source of error in the predicted ordering was the 
element "short skirt (plain)" which had a predicted rank 3 and 
an actual rank 9. When asked what was unsuitable about this 
element for this situation, 84 said "It's a bit too constraining, 
. , 
I was thinking of a straight short skirt, work-type skirt, and 
it's just not in the party spirit, it's nothing special, it's 
the sort of thing you'd wear every day." 84 agreed that these 
considerations were not reflected in the constructs in the 
grid. Hence, it is not surprising that the Raiffa prediction 
for this situation was weak. 
An example of the latter case arose with 82 who had chosen to 
consider decisions in relation to books. During the time which 
elapsed between the grid-elicitation and the first weighting-
eliCitation, 82 re-read some of the books used as elements. 
The Raiffa prediction was exceptionally weak and this was traced 
back to the fact that, although 82 was still construing the 
books in the same terms, her rating of the books had changed 
as a result of re-reading. 
-lG&-
The matter is further complicated by the fact that Personal 
Construct Theory, the theoretical basis of the repertory grid 
(Kelly, 1955), actually predicts a certain amount of construct 
movement over time. The fact that Chapman (op. cit.) did not 
encounter problems with this is probably attributable to the 
stability of people's construing of mathematical command terms. 
However, since one is constantly seeing new clothes, reading 
new books, hearing new records and so forth, a certain amount 
of construct movement is to be expected. Hence, if we asked 
subjects to rank order the elements at various intervals (say, 
every month), we would expect the Raiffa prediction to be 
progressively weaker and weaker. 
Of course, the various so~rces of 'noise' in the system are 
not mutually exclusive, and hence in anyone situation the 
fact that the correlation is less than 1.0 may be due to both 
construct movement and weighting inaccuracy. 
CONCLUSIONS. 
-----------
1). Although the curve-fitting approach was not very 
successful in the present case, comments about decision 'style' 
made earlier (p.1~~ would seem to merit further investigation. 
For this reason, curve-fitting should be maintained as an 
available technique for future work. 
2). The method of rank-ordering constructs by means other 
than the Raiffa method was left aside earlier (p.155) since it 
has not yet been systematically investigated. It would seem 
worthwhile to investigate whether subjects themselves can 
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simply rank-order constructs in terms of their differential 
applicability to different situations. Tentative preliminary 
investigations suggest that subjects may find this task very 
difficul t. 
3). In view of the possible construct movement, two lines of 
approach seem possible:-
a) During a weighting-eliciting session, the subject 
could be asked to re-rate'his elements on his 
constructs. This would yield a measure of the 
movement which has taken place. 
b) During a weighting-eliciting session, the subject 
could be 'talked back into' his grid so that he 
adopts the same construing position each time. 
Of course, neither approach takes account of the fact that 
decisions may be based on constructs which simply are not 
. , 
represented in the grid. In fact, it would be quite difficult 
to take account of such constructs since, although they can 
be elicited (see p.1G1), they would need to be systematically ,-~ 
incorporated in the hierarchy used for the weighting-
elicitation. The time taken for such incorpo~ation may allow 
further addittonal constructs to come into play, and hence we 
would be back where we started. 
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CASE 1 
Defendant: John Smith (male, aged 28). 
Charge: Larceny of various foodstuffs, value £1.50. 
Plea: Consents summary trial/pleads guilty. 
Prosecution case: Store detective saw.defendant wandering around, 
looking "slightly dazed". Occasionally put items 
of food in his shopping bag. He was stopped as he 
left the store and the items were found in his bag. 
When charged and cautioned, he made no reply. 
Defence: 
Background: 
The defendant does not remember going into the 
store or putting food in his bag, but he does not 
deny that he was found in possession. He has been 
worrying a lot about his wife lately since she is 
expecting their third child. 
Defendant is married with two children (aged 2 and 4). 
Earns £20 per week (after deductions) as a labourer 
in a garden centre. Has held same job for last six 
years. 
Rent £7.50 per week; no other income or financial 
commi tments. 
No previous convictions. 
I 
j 
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CASE 2 
Defendant: Frederick Bloggs (male, aged 47). 
Charge: Possession of an offensive weapon (lock-knife) and 
using it in a threatening manner. 
Plea: Elects summary trial/pleads guilty. 
Prosecution case: Police were called to despatch department of factory 
where they found the defendant sitting in a corneY' 
holding the knife. The department manager claims he 
told the defendant to go home since he smelled 
heavily of alcohol and seemed a little unsteady, 
whereupon the defendant pulled out the knifo and 
threatened him with it. He offered no resistance to 
the Police, and when charged and cautioned made no 
reply. 
Defence: The defendant uses the knife in his work and for 
fishing. He feels that the drink must have "got th~~' 
better of him". 
Background: Defendant is married with two children, both married 
and living in their own homes. 
Earns £30 per week (after deductions) as packer in 
despatch department. Has held job for three years. 
Rent £8 per week; Wife working part-time earns £8.50 
per week (after deductions); T.V. rental £1.50 per 
week. No previous convictions. 
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CASE 3 
Defendant: Albert Smuggins (male, aged 32). 
Charge: Larceny of silver teapot, value £250. 
Plea: Consents summary trial/pleads not guilty. 
Prosecution case: Defendant seen by plain clothes policeman to go 
Defence: 
Verdict: 
Background: 
up to antique stall in street market. While salesman 
was dealing with another customer, the defendant 
placed the teapot in his bag and walked away. He 
was arrested and the teapot was found in his bag. 
When charged and cautioned, he made no reply. 
The defendant had no intention of stealing the 
teapot. He had picked it up to examine it, and it 
must have over-balanced and fallen into his bag 
when he returned it to the front of the stall. (The 
defendant is legally represented). 
Guilty. 
Defendant is single. 
Has had several short-term employments recently. Now 
earns £38 per week (after deductions) as a building 
labourer. 
Rent £7 per week. No other income or financial 
commi tments. / contd ••• 
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Previous 
Convictions: Feb. 1960. Larceny. Fine £2. 
Jan. 1962. Larceny. Fine £5. 
May 1964. Larceny. Fine £10. 
Jan. 1968. Larceny. Probation 2 years. 
Aug. 1973. Larceny. Imprisonment 3 months. 
. , 
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SENTENCE NUMBER 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
I 1 4 2 1 3 5 6 7 8 9 10 
2 4 1 2 3 5 6 7 8 9 10 
3 10 3 2 9 1 4 6.5 6.5, 6.5 6.5 
Q) 4 6 4 1 2 3 5 7 8 9 10 +' 
r--l ro 
t'::l 
H 
+' 5 10 2 4 3 1 5 6 7 8 9 
tI) U,l 
<t:l ·rl 6 6 4 1 2, 3 5 8.5 8.5 8.5 8.5 0 b.O 
~ 7 10 3 1 4 2 5 6 7 8 9 
. 
8 10 2 1 4 3 5 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 
I 9 6 5 2 1 4 3 8.5 8.5 8.5 8.5 
1 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 1 2 3 
2 10 9 5 8 7 1 2 3 4 6 
3 10 8 4 9 1 2 3 5 6 7 
Q) 4 10 5 2 4 1 3 6 7 8 9 +' 
N ro 5 10 4 3 5 1 2 6 7 8 9 H f£l +' 
tI) U,l 6 10 8 7 9 1 3 2 4' 5 6 <t:l ·rl 0 b.O 
~ 7 10 2 1 8 4 3 5 6 7 9 
8 10 9 2 8 1 3 4 5 6 7 
9 10 5 3 4 1 ' 2 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 
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Rank Ordering of Sentences by Each Magistrate for Each Case'. 
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1 0.0 
2 4.4 0.0 
3 5.7 1.9 0.0 
4 3.9 2.3 2.2 0.0 
5 4.8 1.7 2.2 2.4 0.0 
6 3.3 2.4 3.2 2.6 2.1 0.0 
7 2.9 4.2 5.4 4.2 4.1 2.2 0.0 
8 3.0 4.8 6.0 4.8 4.} 2.8 0.6 0.0 
9 3.1 5.3 6.6 5.3 5.2 3.3 1.1 0.6 0.0 
10 3.2 5.9 7.1 5.9 5.8 3.9 1.7 1.1 0.6 0.0 
CASE 1 Mean Confusion Matrix. 
1 0.0 
2 3.4 0.0 
3 6.1 2.7 0.0 
4 3.1 1.7 3.2 0.0 
5 7.4 4.4 2.4 4.3 0.0 
6 7.3 4.1 2.1 4.2 1.9 0.0 
7 5.6 4.1 3.4 3.9 3.4 2.2 0.0 
8 4.9 4.1 3.8 3.7 4.5 3.5 1.3 0.0 
9 4.1 3.8 4.1 3.3 4.9 3.9 2.0 0.9 0.0 
10 2.9 3.6 4.5 2.8 5.4 4.8 2.9 2.0 1.1 0.0 
CASE 2 Mean Confusion Matrix. 
1 0.0 
2 1.1 0.0 
3 3.2 2.1 0.0 
4 2.0 1.3 2.1 0.0 
5 3.1 2.0 1.9 1.1 0.0 
6 5.2 4.1 2.4 3.2 2.1 0.0 
7 5.0 3.9 2.7 3.0 1.9 2.0 0.0 
8 7.0 5.9 3.8 5.0 3.9 2.4 2.0 0.0 
9 7.7 6.6 4.4 5.7 4.6 3.3 2.9 1.6 0.0 
10 7.3 6.2 4.3 5.3 4.2 3.4 2.8 1.7 1.2 0.0 
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CASE 3 Mean Confusion Matrix. 
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